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Appellees and Cross-Appellants, including Steve S. Christensen (Christensen),
through counsel, hereby submit their initial brief, supporting their cross-appeal and
responding to the arguments presented by Appellant Charles C. Rehn (Rehn).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)G).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Appellees present their issues, on cross-appeal, for this Court's consideration.
Appellees then comment on Rehn's framing of the issues and propose alternate phrasing.

I.

APPELLEES' ISSUES

Issue 1:
Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Rehn on
the first two elements of slander of title (publication of a false statement slandering title1)
where Rehn's ownership of the property in question was connected to Christensen's
representation of Rehn in the divorce and where evidence that Rehn had agreed to a
consensual lien was undisputed.
1.

Standard of Review. Utah's appellate courts review summary judgments for

correctness, giving no deference to the lower court's conclusions of law. Dillon v. S. Mgmt.

Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, ,r 21, 326 P.3d 656. "Rather, [they] review de novo
whether the record shows that 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' Id (quoting U.R.C.P. 56(c)).
Summary judgments may be affirmed on alternative grounds. Id Courts are to view "the

1

See Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, ,r 36, 326 P.3d 656.
1
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facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party." Orois v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,I 6, 177 P.3d 600 (quoting another source).
2.

Preservation. Appellees filed a memorandum opposing Rehn's motion for

summary judgment. R. 675-760. Key portions of the memorandum are located at R. 690,
702-03, and 707. In its ruling, the district court accounted for arguments about both a
statutory attorney lien and a consensual lien. R 1957.
Issue 2:
Whether the district court erred in denying Appellees' motion for a directed verdict
on the third element of slander of title (malice2) where Rehn failed to produce evidence that
Christensen knew that Appellees' lien was false and unenforceable.
1.

Standard of Review. "Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion

for directed verdict for correctness." Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226, ,r 6.
(citation omitted). This Court affirms denials of directed verdicts "when a review of the
evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party demonstrates that 'reasonable
minds could disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict."' Id. (quoting another
source).
2.

Preservation. This issue was preserved at R. 3945:122-24. The topic was also

addressed at the summary judgment stage. R. 708-09.
Issue 3:
Whether the district court erred in denying Appellees' motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, new trial, where the jury awarded Rehn

2

Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. &tirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, ,r 36.
2
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$77,752.29 in slander of title damages not only for attorney fees he incurred to remove
Appellees' lien by initiating this case, obtaining a preliminary injunction, and prevailing on
summary judgment,3 but also for attorney fees he incurred in relation to the following
matters: bankruptcy remedies, bar complaints, wrongful lien, civil conspiracy, intentional
interference with economic relations, promissory estoppel, permanent injunctions, equitable
estoppel, and a failed motion to strike Christensen's declaration.
1.

Standard of Review. "[A] district court may grant aJNOV motion only if

there is no 'basis in the evidence, inc;:luding reasonable inferences which could be drawn
therefrom, to support the jury's determination."' ASCUTAH, Inc. v. Wo!fMountain Resorts,

GL,,

LC, 2013 UT 24, ,r 18, 309 P.3d 201 (quoting Braithwaite v. W. Valley City Corp., 921 P.2d
997, 999 (Utah 1996)). Utah appellate courts "review rulings on JNOV motions for
correctness." Id. (citing Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah 1996). A
district court's denial of a motion for a new trial is reversed "only if there is no reasonable
basis for the decision." Id.

,r 21 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah

1991).
2.

Preservation. This issue was preserved at R. 3656-75, 3865-69. The JNOV

motion was related to a motion for directed verdict made at trial. R. 3945:125, 127. In
moving for that directed verdict, Appellees were essentially renewing their second motion
for summary judgment. R. 1997-99.

3

The first summary judgment ruling disposed of the lien and Appellees' attempt to enforce
it. R. 1955-59.

3
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II.

COMMENTS ON AND REPHRASING OF REHN'S ISSUES

Issue 1:
Rehn's phrasing of his first issue exaggerates the connection between Rehn prevailing
on his tort claim and Rehn defeating Appellees' contract-based counterclaim. The phrasing
incorrectly implies that the claims were mutually exclusive and resolved simultaneously. In
reality, the district court refused to extend the reciprocal attorney fee statute to a situation
wherein Rehn incurred attorney fees to pursue a one-sided tort claim beyond the summary
judgment ruling that had quieted title to Rehn's property and dismissed Appellees' sole
counterclaim. R. 3721-24. Admittedly, after summary judgment, Appellees referred to the
contract's existence to show a lack of malice. But Appellees did not pursue further contract
claims.
Therefore, Rehn' s first issue on appeal is more appropriately phrased as follows:
Whether the district court correctly refused to extend the reciprocal attorney fee statute to
attorney fees incurred in litigation wherein neither party relied on the contract between them
as a basis for recovery.

Issue 2:
The jury awarded Rehn most of the attorney fees he had incurred prior to the
summary judgment quieting Rehn's title and dismissing Appellees' contractual counterclaim.

See R. 3656-75. Hence, Rehn's request for an equitable award of attorney fees is for fees
incurred to pursue his slander of title tort claim. Appellees' subsequent efforts were only to
defend against a slander of title judgment and not as ''litigation to force [Rehn] into
capitulating to paying off the falsified lien."

4
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Appropriately trimmed down, Rehn' s second issue on appeal is thus: Whether the
district court, in refusing to award Rehn attorney fees on an equitable basis, abused its
discretion by failing to consider as a factor that the party held liable for slandering plaintiff's
title was plaintiff's attorney when he slandered plaintiff's title.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann.§ 38-2-7 (Addendum 1)
Utah Code Ann.§§ 38-12-102 & 103 (Addendum 2)
Utah Code Ann~§ 78B-5-826 (Addendum 3)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
On cross-appeal, Appellees appeal the district court's final judgment and underlying

rulings. Appellees also appeal the district court's denial of their motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or new trial. Rehn is appealing the district court's refusal to
award him the attorney fees incurred to pursue his tort action.
II.

DISPOSITION BELOW
The case commenced below on February 15, 2013, with Rehn's complaint, which

alleged five causes of action against Appellees arising from an Appellee recording a notice of
lien on Rehn's property. R. 1-109. Appellees answered and counterclaimed for enforcement
of the underlying lien. R. 313-52. On summary judgment, Rehn prevailed on his declaratory
relief and against Appellees' counterclaim. R. 3616-20, 1955-59. At trial, Rehn prevailed on
his slander of title claims. R. 3616-20. Rehn's other claims, aside from his unsuccessful post-

5
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trial motion for an· award of attorney fees, were mooted, dismissed, or withdrawn and are
not at issue on appeal. Id.
Rehn prevailed on his declaratory relief claim at summary judgment. R. 1955-59,
Addendum 4. The summary judgment ruling construed Rehn's declaratory relief claim as a
quiet title claim, invalidated Appellees' lien, released $40,000 that was held in escrow to
Rehn, and dismissed Appellees' counterclaim for enforcement of the lien. R. 1955-59, 3618.
On summary judgment, Rehn established the first and second elements of slander of
title-publication of a false and slanderous statement. R. 1955-59. The remaining two
elements, malice and damages, were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in
Rehn's favor. R. 3616-20, Addendum 5. The jury concluded that Rehn had suffered
$77,752.29 in damages. Id. The $77,752.29 purportedly represented attorney fees that were
reasonably necessary to remove Appellees' lien. 4 R. 3656-75.
After trial, Appellees moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial,
arguing that the damages award was inappropriate because many of the fees were for
unrelated matters, for unspecified matters, or plainly excessive. R. 3656-7 5, Addendum 6.
The district court denied this motion. R. 3865-69, Addendum 7.
Also after trial, the district court denied Rehn' s motion for attorney fees incurred to
carry the slander of title claim beyond termination of Appellees' lien and dismissal of
Appellees' counterclaim. R. 3721-24, Addendum 8.

The district court's initial summary judgment order terminated any and all rights Appellees
may have had under the lien. R. 1955-59.
4
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III.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In 1995, Rehn consulted Christensen regarding filing a divorce. R. 3945:19-20.

Around June 1996, Rehn retained the law firm of Henriod, Nielsen & Christensen ("HNC")
to represent him in a divorce, with Christensen acting as lead counsel. R. 689. During the
proceedings, Rehn soµght advice from Christensen regarding the marital home, known as
the "Saddleback Property." R. 715. At the time, Rehn was leasing the Saddleback Property.
R. 679. Rehn consulted with Christensen about the possibility of purchasing the Saddleback

Property. R. 715. Specifically, Rehn wondered how his potential purchase of the property
would affect the divorce distribution. R. 715. Christensen advised that a purchase prior to
entry of the divorce decree would bring the property within the jurisdiction of the divorce
court-particularly if Rehn used marital funds to make the purchase. R. 715. In light of
Rehn's overall goals, Christensen advised Rehn to buy the property post-divorce. R. 715.
Thereafter, the divorce decree entered near September 1997. R. 689. Subsequently, in
February 2000, Rehn purchased the Saddleback Property, achieving the pre-divorce goal of
living in the marital residence post-divorce. R. 679.
For purposes of appealing the divorce, Rehn again hired HNC (with Christensen as
lead attorney), signing a representation agreement on October 24, 1997. R. 689. Appellees
asserted that the agreement granted HNC a contractual lien on Rehn's residence and real
property. 5 R. 690.

5

Below, the district court construed Appellees' pleadings as judicially admitting that no
contractual right to a lien existed. R. 1957.
7
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On or about June 30, 1998, while Rehn's appeal was pending, HNC was dissolved. 6
R. 690. Immediately thereafter, on July 1, 1999, Christensen formed a new law firm, Steve S.
Christensen, P.C. ("SSC"). R. 690. The HNC partners assigned the right to collect Rehn's
unpaid fees to SSC. R. 690. 7 Rehn asked Christensen to continue pursuing the appeal on his
behalf and did not object to the fact that Christensen was continuing work on the appeal as
an employee of SSC. R. 690.
Rehn was not ignorant of the fact that he had become a client of SSC. See R. 691. On
November 18, 1999, SSC sent a letter to Rehn informing Rehn that Christensen's billing rate
had increased to $120 per hour. R. 691. Rehn did not object to the increased fee or complain
that SSC was billing him for services rendered. R. 691. SSC mailed another letter regarding a
fee increase on November 8, 2000. R. 691. Once again, Rehn did not object. R. 691.
Meanwhile, SSC sent Rehn monthly billing statements regarding fees and interest on fees
Rehn owed for services performed by both SSC and HNC. R. 691. Rehn paid some of the
amounts SSC billed. R. 716.
By June 30, 2001, Rehn owed approximately $26,000 in fees and interest for legal
services related to the divorce case, appeal, and remand. R. 692. 8

6

HNC ceased doing business on June 30, 1998. The appellate court rendered its decision,
later, on February 19, 1999. Seegeneral/y &hn v. R.ehn, 1999 UT App 041, 974 P.2d 306.
7

The assignment was oral and not placed in writing until shortly before Rehn filed his
complaint. R. 3944:198.
8

Rehn owed Appellees an additional $830 for Christensen's assistance on a small matter
known as the Hertz matter and unrelated to the divorce or divorce appeal. R. 3944:239. No

new agreement was signed for the Hertz matter. R. 3944:233-34.
8
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On July 20, 2001, Christensen, an authorized agent of SSC, prepared, signed, and
subsequently caused to be recorded an Amended Notice of Attorney Lien (the "Notice") on
the Saddleback Property in the amount of $26,807.14, plus interest. See R. 346. ·
There were a number of mistakes in the text of the Notice, largely stemming from
Christensen using a template to draft the Notice. R. 3944:240. The template came from an
amended notice of attorney lien, and in drafting the Notice for Rehn's property, Christensen
failed to remove the word "amended" from the title. R. 3944:240-41. In using the template,
Christensen also failed to update the citation to the attorney lien statute to reflect that as of a
few months prior to Christensen drafting the Notice, Utah Code § 38-2-7 had replaced § 7851-41 as controlling attorney liens. R. 3944:194-95. Another problem in the Notice stemmed
from Christensen placing the property description into the first paragraph of template and
failing to realize both that the language in the first paragraph delved into the lien's basis and
focused solely on property that was the subject of the representation and did not account for
the law allowing attorney liens to also attach to property connected to the representation.
R. 3944:241-42.

The notice also conflated billing for the Hertz matter with Rehn' s divorce and appeal
billing statements and erroneously stated in the Notice that Rehn owed approximately
$26,800 in relation to his divorce instead of approximately only $26,000. R 3944:241-42.
Rehn also claimed an error in the Notice that Rehn had employed Christensen
beginning in 1995, rather than 1996. R. 3944:290. However, on the witness stand, Rehn
confessed that he and Christensen had met about the divorce in 1995. R. 3945:19.

9
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In August 2001, the monthly invoice Appellees sent to Rehn contruned a notation
regarding the recording of the lien. R. 3944:170-71. On September 26, 2001, SSC sent a
copy of the Notice to Rehn. R. 692. In the letter, SSC stated,
Now that you are back working, you indicated you will be able to make
arrangements to pay off your attorney's fees with this firm. You discussed
possibly taking out a home equity loan to do that. I am told by lenders that
you are able to withdraw a higher percentage of your equity if the money is to
refinance existing obligations rather than to obtrun cash for yourself In the
event that it would be helpful, I have filed the enclosed attorney's lien for your
use in a refinance. If it turns out that this lien will not be useful to you, I can
release the lien. 9

R. 753. Rehn received the September 26, 2001, letter and copy of the Notice. R. 692.
Subsequently, Rehn and Christensen met on January 15, 2002, to discuss Rehn's
unpaid attorney fees. R. 692. Rehn requested that SSC refrrun from charging him interest for
six months and allow him to pay $125 per month in exchange for a lien against all of Rehn's
estate, including future assets and inheritances. R. 692. Christensen memorialized the
resulting agreement in a letter he sent to Rehn on January 15, 2002, which included the
following paragraph:
You also agree guarantee [sic] payment to me from your current assets, the
assets of your estate, the assets of any trust, life insurance and/ or any other
instrument established by your hold to your assets. By this guarantee, you
instruct your personal representative to pay your obligation to me as one of
the debts of your estate. You also agree to give me the right to collect from
any of the beneficiaries of your estate or assets at or after the time of the gift,
devise or bequest or from the buyer of any of your property. However, this
guarantee cannot be used to collect money from you except at the time you
sell or give away any of your current assets or at the time of your death.
R. 756-57.
9 Throughout

the proceedings, Rehn has asserted that "I can release the lien" somehow
means "I will release the lien if you merely request me to do so." But, this is not what that
sentence says.
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The agreement made forbearance of interest contingent on Rehn's making timely
payments of at least $125 per month. See id.
Although Rehn did not return a signed copy of the document to SSC, R. 693, he did
not object to its terms orally or in writing, either. R. 693. In accordance with the agreement,
SSC refrained from charging Rehn interest for six months and did not attempt to directly
collect any additional money from Rehn during that time. R. 693. SSC also refrained from
judicial attempts to collect money from Rehn personally. R. 693. As contemplated by the
agreement, Rehn also made one or two payments in the amount of$125. R. 3944:249.
On February 13, 2002, SSC again sent a copy of the Notice to Rehn, giving notice to
Rehn that SSC had not released the lien. R. 693. In the following eleven years, Rehn did not
ask one time for Christensen to remove the lien. R. 3944:252.
Although Rehn subsequently received a Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge of his
personal obligations, he did not file any motion or action in the bankruptcy court challenging
the validity, nature, or extent of Appellees' lien. See R. 694. The bankruptcy court did not
enter an order avoiding the lien, and Rehn admitted as much in discovery. R. 694. Indeed, at
trial, Rehn testified that he and his bankruptcy attorney decided not to worry about the lien

based on their interpretation of the letter where SSC stated that he could release the lien to
facilitate the refinance Rehn had proposed to pay the attorney fees. R 3944:293.
For the eleven years between September 26, 2001, and January 13, 2013, Rehn did
not object to SSC recording the Notice. R. 694. During that time, he did not ask for the lien
to be removed, suggest that the lien could not attach to the Saddleback Property, or allege
that it was wrongful or illegal. R. 694.
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Rehn did not ever challenge the lien until he attempted to sell his house. R. 3944:272.
Ultimately, he initiated the proceedings below. Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellees' Issue 1:
Addressing Rehn's slander of title claim, the district court, on partial summary
judgment, erroneously ruled that Appellees had published a false statement slandering
Rehn's title to the Saddleback Property. Despite scrivener's errors in the notice of lien,
Appellees held a valid attorney's lien and/ or a consensual lien against Rehn's property. This
Court should reverse this harmful error.
The existence of an attorney's lien is automatic as per the attorney's lien statute.
Attorney's liens apply to property that is both the subject of the representation or connected
with the representation. In Sumsion, the connection between land on which a worker's
compensation incident occurred and the worker's compensation litigation was noted as
being plausible.
An attorney's lien exists regardless of attempts to enforce it in court or to file a notice
of lien. The attorney's lien statute does not address improper notice, but improper notice
does not invalidate similar statutory liens.
Appellees held a valid attorney's lien because Rehn's property was connected to
Christensen's representation of Rehn in Rehn's divorce. At one point, Rehn consulted
Christensen about potential purchase of the property and the effect on the divorce. Further,
the property had been the marital home, even if only by lease. Admittedly, the notice of lien
contained a number of inaccuracies, caused by Christensen using a template to draft the lien.
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Regardless, Appellees' attorney's lien existed and the notice gave to the world an accurate
description of the land, the parties, the underlying action, the agreement between the parties,
and the approximate amount of the lien. The scrivener's errors in the Notice did not cause
the lien to cease to exist.
Appellees notice of lien was further justified because they held a consensual lien as
per a retainer agreement. The district court erroneously concluded that Appellees had
judicially admitted in their pleadings that no consensual lien existed. Further, all pleadings
should be construed to do substantial justice, and the whole effect of a pleading should be
considered.
Although Appellees correctly admitted that "there is no signed agreement between
SSC and Rehn," they were not asked if HNC and Rehn had a signed agreement. Appellees
quoted and alleged a consensual lien in that same pleading. The district court should not
have construed that pleading as a judicial admission that there was no consensual lien.
Additionally, a slander of title is an unfounded claim of interest in the property. The
assertion that a lien exists is the key assertion for slander of title. The misstatements in the
notice should not give rise to a slander of title claim where a lien exists.
Because a different ruling by the district court would have led to Appellees' avoiding
a slander of title judgment or otherwise being able to present their case on these issues, the
district court's ruling is harmful, reversible error.

Appellees' Issue 2:
The district court should have granted Appellees' motion for a directed verdict on the
issue of malice because Rehn failed to establish that Christensen acted with malice.
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Regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks to establish actual or implied malice, the plaintiff
must establish that the defendant had actual knowledge that the statements at issue were
false.

In Dillon, the defendant had asserted its loss of lien rights as a basis for another
lawsuit. Thus, the Dillon defendant acted with malice because it affirmatively knew that its
lien rights were gone. In Banberry Crossing, the defendant, through more due diligence,
probably could have ascertained that there was no valid lien, but because he did not actually
know, he did not act with malice.

In this case, Rehn established that Appellees made several scrivener's errors and
ascribed the worst sort of intentions to Christensen, thus swaying the jury to find malice.
However, Rehn failed to present evidence showing that Christensen had actual knowledge
that he held no right to a lien against Rehn's property. Indeed, Christensen was not aware he
held no lien until the district court imposed a narrow interpretation of the attorney lien
statute and a broad interpretation of Appellees' admissions in their pleadings in support of
its determination on summary judgment. Admittedly, Rehn established that Christensen
knew there were some scrivener's errors in the notice of lien, but Rehn did not produce
evidence that Christensen knew he had no lien against Rehn's property. The district court's
failure to grant the directed verdict on malice is harmful and reversible error because it
resulted in a judgment against Christensen.
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Appellees' Issue 3:
The district court incorrectly denied Appellees' motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. The amount of damages the jury awarded Rehn far exceeded the amount of
attorney fees reasonably necessary for Rehn to remove Appellees' lien.

In slander of title cases, attorney fees may be awarded as damages if reasonably
necessary to remedy the improper disparagement of the plaintiffs title. Utah case law
6,

defining "reasonably necessary" is scarce. Appellees propose that to be reasonably necessary,
attorney fees should be reasonable in amount and incurred to pursue of reasonable method
of remedying disparagement of title-like a quiet title action. Though Utah case law is not
extensive, it does clearly establish that attorney fees incurred to pursue a slander of title claim
are per se ineligible to be awarded as part of the damages in a slander of title action. Utah
case law requires a showing of necessity and specificity and thus aligns with the result in a
Maine case in which the quiet title counts were the only portions of a multi-claim lawsuit for
which attorney fees could be properly awarded.
At trial, Rehn and one of his attorneys testified that nearly $80,000 was reasonably
necessary to carry Rehn's case from his hiring his attorneys to quieting title on summary
judgment. Although the testimony provides a basis to support the jury's award, some
portions of that amount were, as a matter of law, not reasonably necessary to remedy the
disparagement of title. The jury's award included fees Rehn incurred to pursue slander of
title and many other avenues of offense against Appellees, including bar complaints and
bankruptcy sanctions, the natural result of which could not directly quiet title and thus could
not be reasonable necessary to remedy disparagement of title. Rehn further failed to specify
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for what matters many of his fees were incurred. Additionally, Rehn incurred nearly $8,000
on a failed motion to strike Christensen's declaration. The district court should have granted
Appellees' JNOV motion. Because failure to do so left the judgment in favor of Rehn
unreduced, the error constitutes harmful, reversible error.

Rehn's Issue 1:
The reciprocal attorney fee statute does not apply to Rehn's pursuit of a slander of
title tort claim against Appellees beyond the summary judgment ruling quieting Rehn's title
and dismissing Appellees' counterclaim.
·..,j)

The statute applies to actions based on contract. An action is based on contract if the
contract's enforceability is alleged as a basis for recovery. The attorney fees from reciprocal
awards under the statute must be allocated--or separated-from attorney fees incurred to
pursue causes of action for which no attorney fee award is permissible.
Between the summary judgment quieting title and dismissing Appellees' counterclaim
and the resolution of Rehn's slander of title claim, no party asserted contract as a basis for
recovery. Indeed, Rehn's slander of title claim relied on there being no enforceable contract.
And, Appellees' assertion that a contract existed could only prove lack of malice and could
not result in a judgment for Appellees or any sort of recovery.

Rehn's Issue 2:
The American Rule provides that each party bears their own expenses unless a statute
or contract provides to the contrary. Further, equity follows the law and should not be used
as a way to circumvent established law such as the American Rule. A district court may
award attorney fees on an equitable basis in extenuating circumstances. However, a district
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court is also free to refuse to make such an award. The Utah Supreme Court has granted
district courts considerable latitude and exceedingly broad discretion in these matters. The
district court is in the best position to judge the equities.
Rehn argues that the district court ignored the fact that Rehn was Christensen's client
when Christensen first recorded the notice of lien. Quite simply, the district court did
consider this fact and no doubt weighed it against all testimony and other observations the
district court made throughout the litigation.
Further, there are a number of equities in favor of Appellees including that Rehn did
incur the attorney fees knowingly, and the appeal he requested was completed without him
paying for the work-the notice of lien was not based on an imaginary obligation.

Attorney Fees on Appeal:
Because Rehn is not entitled to attorney fees below, he is not entitled to attorney fees
on appeal.

ARGUMENT
APPELLEES' ISSUES

I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE SLANDER OF TITLE
JUDGMENT BECAUSE APPELLEES HELD AVALID LIEN
On summary judgment, the district court erroneously ruled that Rehn had established

the first and second elements of slander of title (publication of a false and slanderous
statement) based on its incorrect conclusion that Appellees held no attorney lien or
consensual lien against Rehn's property. R. 1955-59. The district court should have ruled
that Appellees held a valid attorney lien and a valid consensual lien. Further, the court should
have concluded that Appellees had made no false statement disparaged title and dismissed
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Rehn's slander of title claim. Alternatively, the district court should have concluded there
was a dispute as to material facts and refrained from entering summary judgment on the first
two elements of the slander of title claim. This Court should reverse the district court's
erroneous decision because it was harmful to Appellees.
A.

Appellees held a valid attorney lien against Rehn.

Appellees held a valid attorney lien against Rehn because there was a connection
between Rehn's property and Christensen's representation of Rehn in the divorce and
divorce appeal. Scrivener's errors in the notice of lien do not cause the lien to cease to exist.
An "attorney's lien commences at the time of employment of the attorney by the

client," or in a domestic relations matter, where the client has failed to pay and either the
attorney-client relationship has ended or a final order of divorce has been entered. Utah
Code Ann. § 38-2-7(3), (11). An attorney's lien covers "money or property owned by the
client that is the subject of or connected with work performed for the client .... " Id. § 38-27(2). It is permissible for an attorney lien to stretch beyond property that was the direct
subject of the work-the property need only be connected. 10 See Bay Harbor Farm, LC v.

Sumsion, 2014 UT App 133, ~ 15,329 P.3d 46 (stating "the statute includes the phrase
'connected with' in addition to the phrase 'the subject of,' indicating that the statute was
meant to cover more than those cases where the land is the actual subject of the lawsuit").
For example, in Sumsion, this Court held that it would be plausible to find a connection

Implicitly, U.C.A. § 38-2-7 suggests that the property subject to the attorney's lien need
not be owned by the client at the earliest ti.me the lien may commence because the property
that is the subject of the lawsuit becomes the client's property only by virtue of the
subsequent judgment. Similarly, here, Rehn obtained alienable interest sometime after the
divorce decree was entered.

10
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between land on which a worker's compensation incident occurred and the worker's
compensation claim itself.
Any errors made in an attempt to enforce or give notice of an attorney's lien do not
invalidate the lien. "A discrimination must be made between the things that are necessary to
acquire a lien and those that are merely intended to protect the interests of'' other parties. See

Utah Sav. & L,oanAss'n v. Mecham, 366 P.2d 598, 601-02 (Utah 1961). A close reading of
Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 demonstrates that an attorney lien exists regardless of whether the
attorney enforces it in court or files notice. 11 It logically follows that an attorney lien exists
even if attorneys enforcing or giving notice make scrivener's errors as they attempt to
exercise their options to enforce or give notice.
Moreover, pursuant to the canons of statutory construction, the procedures in the
attorney lien statute for filing a notice of lien are not required to obtain a valid lien. To
interpret a statute, courts look first at the statute's plain language. Otter Creek &serooir Co. v.

New Escalante Irrigation Co., 2009 UT 16, ,r 14, 203 P.3d 1015. And, a statute's plain language
must be read "as a whole" and "in harmony" with other statutory provisions in the same or
related chapters. State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, ,r 10, 203 P.3d 1000 (quoting another case).
Reading the attorney's lien statute in harmony with related lien provisions, failure to
follow the enforcement and notice procedures outlined in the statute do not invalidate an
attorney lien. The attorney lien statute is part of Title 38 of the Utah Code, which governs all
liens. U.C.A. § 38-2-7(5)-(6) addresses notice of an attorney's lien. U.C.A. § 38-12-102

11

By statute, if the client is obliged to compensate the attorney, the attorney's lien exists by
operation of law; enforcement or recording of notice is not necessary to create it. See U.C.A.
§ 38-2-7 (2), (4)-(5).
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outlines generic notice requirements. Comparing the two, the notice requirements for filing
notices of attorney liens and for filing other notices of liens are functionally identical.
Because they are functionally identical, it logically should follow that the legislature intended
that they have the same legal effect. And, reading the attorney lien statute's notice
requirements in light of the general lien notice statute's requirements reveals that the
legislature did not intend to condition the validity of an attorney lien on following the
statute's procedures. The attorney lien statute does not explain the effect of the failure to
follow its notice procedures-or even prescribe a penalty. U.C.A. § 38-2-7. However, the
general lien notice statute does prescribe a penalty without invalidating the lien: "Failure to
meet ... notice requirements [of the general lien notice statute] does not ... invalidate any lien
arising at common law or in equity or by any statute of this state; ... " Id. § 38-12-103(3).
Inasmuch as the legislature did not intend to make following the general lien notice
requirements a precondition to the validity of a lien, it would not have intended to make the
attorney lien notice requirements, which are functionally identical to the general lien notice
requirements, a precondition to the validity of an attorney lien.

1.

There was a connection between the properry and Christensen~ representation of
"&hn in the divorce.

As explained supra, during the divorce proceedings, Rehn sought advice from
Christensen as to whether he should purchase the marital home, which he was then leasing. 12
R. 715. Apparently, it was Rehn's goal to live at that residence for the foreseeable future.

Christensen advised that a purchase prior to entry of the divorce decree would bring the

12

Admittedly, Rehn dispute that this conversation took place, but the standard of review
requires facts to be construed in Appellee's favor.
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property within the jurisdiction of the divorce court-particularly if Rehn used marital funds
to make the purchase. R. 715. In light of Rehn's goals, Christensen advised Rehn to buy the
property post-divorce. R. 715.
Undoubtedly, there was a connection between the property and both Rehn's divorce
and subsequent appeal. Rehn consulted Christensen regarding the property in the context of
the divorce. As th~ parties argued and negotiated as to custody, alimony, child support,
division of property and debts, the goal of living in the marital home affected Rehn's
negotiations and decisions. Rehn's presence in the home was a basis to show stability and a
basis for joint custodial rights. See R. 3944:216. Rehn obtained an award of joint custody.
R. 3944:278. His increased custody was directly connected to how to calculate the amount of
child support which was a subject of the appeal. See general!J RBhn v. RBhn, 1999 UT App 041,
974 P.2d 306.
Rehn has pointed out that the divorce decree does not mention the property and that
he did not own the property at the time of the divorce. 13 He is thus focusing only on
whether the property was the subject of the representation. Likewise, the district court also
focused on whether the property was the subject of the representation, giving Christensen
credit only for the time he might have directly discussed the property with Rehn. Focusing
on whether the property was the subject of the divorce case and ceasing inquiry at that
juncture fails to consider the alternative basis for a lien provided by U.C.A. § 38-2-7.
As this Court acknowledged in Sumsion, there need only be a connection between the
property and the representation. Sumsion, 2014 UT App 133, ,r 15. And, in fact, this Court
13

Ironically, one of the goals of the representation was to keep the property out of the
divorce decree.
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has acknowledged that there might be a plausible connection between land and a
representation regarding an incident that occurred on the land. Id. In this case, the property
was the marital home-the location of multiple familial interactions or incidents that were
the subject of litigation or carried out by court order. The evidence related to the location of
the home and its distance from the other parent is a specific factor in joint custody
determinations. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(2)(e). Also, maintaining a status quo for
associations of children in the neighborhood, stability in continuing with the same school
and whether the home is large enough for the children and whether it is well kept are factors
for a court to consider in determining child custody. Further, the home in this case also
affected alimony because Rehn' s expenses related the home impacted his ability to pay
alimony. See Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-5(8). The issue of alimony was raised in the appeal, so it
was connected to the home. See 'Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ,I 6 et seq. The property's
status as the marital home alone puts it on par with the property considered in Sumsion.
But, this case goes beyond that mark because Rehn consulted Christensen about
becoming the property owner and about keeping the property out of the divorce. Rehn's
prospective future ownership of the property (and factors affecting his ability to purchase in
the future) was a consideration in the actual representation.

2.

Regardless ofirregularities, the Ii.en was still enforceable.

Rehn makes much of the fact that Appellees' notice of lien was not an amended
notice, though the title described it as such. Rehn also complains about the statute citation in
the lien, the precise amount owed (which would change regularly even after recording of the
notice), and other language in the Notice. These errors do not cancel the fact that Rehn
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incurred attorney fees and, after the divorce decree entered, did not pay them off. Under
those facts, Appellees had a valid attorney's lien on properties connected to the divorce,
including Rehn's property. The purpose of the notice of lien was simply to put the world on
notice as to the existence of a lien. None of the purported deficits raise questions about the
lien's existence. They may raise a question about the actual amount or as to the history of the
lien, but the recorded lien unambiguously states that a lien exists. Therefore it provides the
requisite notice. Those facts alone bring the lien into existence under operation of the
statutes. None of the claimed procedural irregularities invalidate the lien.
B.

Appellees held a consensual lien against Rehn.

To support its ruling that Appellees had made a false statement with regard to the
second element of title, the district court concluded that Appellees held no consensual lien,
relying on a construction of Appellees' pleadings that did not favor Appellees. R. 1957. Tius
conclusion was erroneous. Further, Appellees had directly asserted the existence of a
consensual lien in their answer. R. 338.
"All pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice." U.R.C.P. 8(£). "In
determining the sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint ... one must not have recourse
to only certain parts of the complaint, but must determine the effect that should be given to
the complaint when considered as a whole." Geros v. Harries, 236 P. 220,222 (Utah 1925).
In paragraph 114 of his complaint, Rehn alleged: "The Lien was also not authorized
by agreement because there is no signed agreement between SSC and Rehn." R. 18.
Appellees answered as follows: ''Defendants admit that there is no signed agreement
authorizing the filing of the lien but deny any other allegations of fact in this paragraph."
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R. 324. This was a true statement. SSC was an entity. Steve Christensen had a lien by
assignment from HNC, but SSC did not have a signed agreement with Rehn. The answer
denies all but the stated assertion. The stated assertion was true as to SSC only, yet the court
gave it the expanded interpretation of meaning that there was no agreement between Rehn
or HNC or SSC or Steve Christensen individually. That reading of the admission goes far
beyond the language of the complaint and erroneously imputes an admission that
Christensen did not make.
Further, in that same document, as part of a counterclaim, Appellees alleged as
follows: "As a term of the retainer agreement, Rehn gave SSC a consensual lien." R. 328.
Appellees then quoted the following part of the agreement between HN C and Rehn:
Henriod, Nielsen & Christensen shall be entitled to a lien for services
rendered including a lien on your residence, other real property or any
subsequent settlement or judgment, as permitted the laws of the State of Utah
or any other state where services are provided, in the event the bill has not
been paid in full with thirty (30) days of billing.
R.338.

In this case, the district court construed Appellees' answer to paragraph 114 of the
complaint as a judicial admission that there was no consensual lien. R. 1957. But, an
admission in an answer only extends to the language asserted in the complaint. Considering
the responsive pleading and counterclaim as a whole, it is clear that same pleading directly
alleges the existence of a consensual lien. Moreover, Appellees have not admitted a lack of
written agreement with HNC as to creation of a lien.
As to the wording of the agreement itself-it does not limit itself to a statutory
attorney's lien. It merely says HNC will have a lien as permitted by law. This means any lien
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that is not illegal. The district court gave the agreement a meaning that is not supported by
,:;,.

'111.!V

its plain language. That is, the district court interpreted the contract to mean "HNC will have
a lien as created by law." Considering that Appellees not only alleged the existence of a
consensual lien, but produced a supporting signed, written document, the district court
should not have construed Appellees' pleadings as an admission that there was no
consensual lien. Further, the court should not have limited the available liens under the
HNC contract. If, in fact, there was a valid lien, there could not be slander of title. Further,
even if Christensen had reason to believe there was a valid lien, there could not be slander of
title under the facts of this case.

C.

Even if there were scrivener's errors in the notice of lien, they were not
sufficient to support a judgment against Appellees for slander of title because
the lien, whether an attorney lien or a consensual lien, was still enforceable.

To prevail on a claim for slander of title, the first two elements a plaintiff must
establish are that "(1) there was a publication of a slanderous statement disparaging
claimant's title" and "(2) the statement was false." Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Co,p. Retirement Trust,
2014 UT 14, ,r 36,326 P.3d 656. A disparaging statement is an "unfounded claim of an
interest in the property which throws doubt upon its ownership." Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P.2d
510, 513 (Utah 1951). Thus, the false statement a plaintiff uses to establish slander of title
must be the statement that claims interest in and throws doubt on ownership of the
property.

In this case, as discussed supra, Appellees held an attorney lien because there was a
connection between Rehn's property and the uncompensated work Christensen performed
for Rehn. Appellees also held a consensual lien. Also discussed supra, the liens existed and
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were enforceable regardless of procedural irregularities in the notice of lien or in notifying
Rehn about the lien. Thus, Appellees' erroneous statements in the lien are irrelevant to
slander of title because they do not affect whether the lien(s) in question exist or are
enforceable. The key is that Appellees held a lien and claimed to hold a lien. Whether the
proper notices were sent and received is another matter not affecting the validity of the
lien. 14 In sum, the statements Appellees made regarding the existence of a lien were not false.
Therefore, the district court's judgment against Appellees for slander of title should be
reversed.

D.

The district court's erroneous summary judgment ruling constitutes harmful
error and should be reversed

Harmful errors are grounds to disturb the erroneous court order. U.R.C.P. 61. An
error is harmful if "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant." State v. LArsen, 2005 UT App 201, ,I 4, 113 P.3d 998.
In this case, the district court's erroneous ruling that Christensen made publication of
a slanderous, false statement resulted in the jury being directed of this negative, but untrue
fact. Therefore, the jury received the message that a court had determined as a matter of law
that Christensen had taken unauthorized action against Rehn. Rehn thereafter obtained a
money judgment against Appellees. Because there was no slander of title, the court should

14

Generally, failure to give proper notice gives rise to certain penalties, but does not
invalidate the lien itself. See Utah Code Ann.§ 38-12-103. Arguably, there may be no penalty
associated with attorney liens. See U.C.A. §§ 38-12-103, 38-12-102(3)(k), & 38-2-7 (imposing
penalties for failing to follow general notice requirements, exempting liens with same or
stricter notice requirements from general notice requirements, and not imposing penalties
for failure to follow notice requirements, respectively).
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have dismissed the slander of title claim on summary judgment. Therefore, the district
court's erroneous ruling constitutes harmful error and this Court should reverse.

II.

ALTERNATIVELY, APPELLEES DID NOT ACTUALLY KNOW THEIR
CLAIM TO A LIEN WAS FALSE.
Rehn argued that the scrivener's errors in the Notice were part of a nefarious

conspiracy against Rehn. However Christensen's testimony that he made honest mistakes in
the form of the lien notice was unrebutted. 15 There was no evidence of malicious intent.
Additionally, there was no evidence that Christensen actually knew he had no lien
rights against Rehn's property. Thus, the district court should have granted Appellees'
motion for a directed verdict on the question of malice. Because the district court's failure to
grant the motion for a directed verdict constituted harmful error, this Court should reverse
the district court and dismiss Rehn's slander of title claim.
A.

A slander of title plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had actual
knowledge that the statements at issue were false.

A plaintiff asserting a slander of title claim must demonstrate not only publication of
a slanderous, false statement, but also that "the statement was made with malice." Dillon v. S.

Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, ~ 36,326 P.3d 656 (emphasis removed). There are
two paths to establishing malice. The first is a showing of actual malice-an "intent to
injure, vex or annoy," or intent founded on "hatred, spite or ill will." Id. (quoting another
source). The second path is a showing of implied malice, which is inferred from the
defendant "knowingly and wrongfully" publishing "something untrue or spurious" where

15

Christensen's testimony regarding his creating the notice of lien using a template is found
at R 3944:240-43.
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the defendant "should reasonably foresee" a possibility of "damage to the owner of the
property." Id. (quoting another source).
Regardless of whether the plaintiff attempts to demonstrate actual or implied malice,
he or she must demonstrate that "the defendant had actual knowledge that the statements at
issue were false." Id. ,I 35. As discussed in this brief, supra, liens come into existence and are
enforceable regardless of irregularities regarding the giving of notice. See Parts I.A.2 & I. C of
Argument.

In Dillon, the defendant, a company that owned thousands of properties, hired a third
party to originate property loans. Dillon ,I 1. Through interactions with the loan originator,
the plaintiffs predecessor in interest paid off the defendant's interest in a property so that
plaintiff's predecessor could sell the property to plaintiff. Id. ,I 8. In a separate lawsuit against
the third party loan originator, the Dilhn defendant sued for that money, asserting that it
"knew of and accepted the consequences of the discharge of the loan." Id. ,I 39.
Undisputedly, in a situation where the Dillon defendant was simultaneously suing the loan
originator for the loss of the interest against the plaintiffs' property, the Dillon defendant
knew that plaintiffs had no obligation and thus was acting with malice in its attempts to
enforce its prior interest against plaintiff. Id. ,I 38.
In Banberry Crossing, a trust deed trustee recorded a notice of default that described an
entire tract of property. First Security Bank of Utah, NA. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253,
1256 (Utah 1989). There were portions of the tract for which the trustee should not have
recorded a notice of default. Id. Despite the notice of default falsely covering properties for
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which there was no colorable claim, the Utah Supreme Court declined to conclude that there
had been malicious behavior sufficient to justify a judgment for slander of title. Id. at 1257.

B.

Appellees hereby marshal the evidence that, taken in the light most favorable
to Rehn, supports a conclusion that Appellees actually knew they held no lien
rights against Rehn.

Christensen admitted that, as of the time of trial, 16 he had "many years [sic]
experience drafting and recording liens." R. 3944:150-51. Christensen also admitted that at
the time he drafted the lien, he was, in a more general sense, experienced. R. 3944:183.
Christensen admitted that he was intimately familiar with the findings of fact in
Rehn' s divorce case and that he was aware that the divorce court did not divide real property
in Rehn's divorce. R. 3944:154, 157, 192.
Christensen was unable to identify or bring forward any invoice sent to Rehn for
services rendered in which Christensen had specifically noted that he was billing Rehn for a
conversation and legal advice regarding Rehn's property. R. 3944:159-60.
Despite Christensen testifying that he had discussed potential future ownership of the
property with Rehn, Christensen had no documentation of the conversation and could not
recall when the conversation took place. R. 3944:162-63. Specifically, Christensen could not
recall the time of year, month, day, or time of day during which the conversation occurred.

Id. Christensen could also not recall whether the conversation was by telephone or inperson. Id.
Christensen admitted that there was only one conversation between he and Rehn
regarding the property. R. 3944:164.

16

The questions directed to Christensen focused on his current status.
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Rehn testified that the conversation regarding the property never took place and that
he could not have afforded to purchase the house at that time, anyway. R. 3944:275, 277.
Christensen admitted that approximately $800 of Rehn's nearly $27,000 bill was for
non-divorce work. R. 3944: 194.
Rehn established that in the same year Appellees recorded the lien against Rehn's
property a new attorney lien statute had gone into effect and that the statute citation in the
notice of lien incorrectly cited to the old statute. R. 3944:194--95.
Rehn accused Christensen of putting the word "amended" into the notice of lien in
an attempt to invoke the previous statute, but Christensen denied this accusation.
R. 3944:196.

The evidence showed that the assignment of Rehn's account to Christensen's control
or ownership was not documented on paper until after the dispute with Rehn arose.
R. 3944:198.

C.

Rehn failed to demonstrate that Appellees actually: knew they held no lien
against him and thus failed to establish malice.

To establish malice, Rehn needed to show that Christensen actually knew that his

claim that Appellees held a lien against Rehn's property was false. See Dillon, 135. In Dillon,
the plaintiffs established malice by showing that the defendant had positively asserted in
another case that it had lost its interest and that the loan originator should be liable for the
loss. Dillon can be distinguished from the present case because Appellees did not
affirmatively assert that they had lost the lien to Rehn' s property and believed the lien valid
until the district court's summary judgment. Rehn has failed to produce evidence showing
that at some point prior to the district court's summary judgment ruling, Christensen or any
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Appellee were aware that they lacked a valid lien on Rehn' s residence. In fact, the evidence
tends to suggest that Christensen always believed he had a lien, even if he should have
known that there were errors in the form of his notice of lien. See R. 3944:258.17
The closest Rehn came to establishing actual knowledge on the part of the Appellees
was Christensen's admission that as of recording of the lien, Christensen was an experienced
attorney18 who was aware that the property was not the subject of the divorce decree.
However, those admissions do not establish that Appellees had actual knowledge that there
was no valid lien, particularly where being mentioned in a divorce decree is not necessarily
the threshold detennination for whether a piece of property is subject to an attorney's lien.
As discussed, supra, the property was the subject of a consultation and was otherwise
connected to the divorce, even if Rehn' s assertion that no such consultation occurred is true.
In Banberry Crossing, there was no malice where the trustee could have presumably
done some research and positively concluded that there was no default possible for certain
parcels in the tract because of certain conveyances. In this case, had Appellees done some
research, the answer as to whether they had a lien would have been inconclusive because
there appears to be no bright-line rule as to what degree of connection is sufficient between
a representation and a property for a valid attorney's lien. If Dillon and Banberry Crossing are

17

Moreover, on appeal, Appellees assert that there was a lien, whether statutory or
consensual.
18 At trial, Rehn emphasized that a new attorney lien statute went into effect during the same
year Christensen recorded the lien and attempted to suggest that Christensen titled the lien
as being amended in an attempt to bring the lien under the older statute. First, it is unclear
how calling the lien amended changes the controlling statute if there is no orig-inal lien.
Second, if anything, the new statute situation should imply that Christensen had become less
experienced with attorney liens and thus less aware that his lien against Rehn might fail.
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placed on a spectrum with Dillon on the left (malice established) and Banberry Crossing on the
right (malice not established), this case falls to the right of Banberry Crossing.
Putting this case far to the right of Banberry Crossing is appropriate because Appellees
never affirmatively asserted in a separate court proceeding that they had lost their interest in
Rehn's property. In fact, the Rehn situation was quite the opposite. Appellees did not
interfere with Rehn's bankruptcy, relying on the validity of the lien against Rehn's property.
R. 3944:254-55. Rehn never challenged the lien although he was represented by counsel in
his bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee never challenged the validity of the lien. The lien was
a matter of public record and the title to the property was held in Rehn's name at the time of
his personal bankruptcy in 2004. Rehn not only had public notice of the lien, but he and
Christensen had discussed the lien and the refinance of his property to pay the outstanding
attorney fees. Christensen had sent more than one notice of the lien to Rehn of the lien.
As to the questions raised about the timing of the transfer of interest between
Christensen's firms, those do not show that Christensen actually knew that he or any of the
Appellees lacked a valid lien. Moreover, there was no evidence to show that there was no
informal transfer of interest. To the contrary, Christensen asserted that on the dissolution of
Henriod, Nielsen & Christensen, he was assigned the right to the Rehn account. This
assertion was unrebutted at trial. Further, the facts of the case support the conclusion that
Christensen was assigned this case. First, he continued to be the only attorney billing on the
case after HNC dissolved. Second, the only other living partner, Clark Nielsen, later signed
an assignment ratifying this assignment.
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The court held that one conversation is not sufficient to make the property the
subject of the representation. However, the law does not support this conclusion.
Christensen was consulted about the property and he gave advice to Rehn concerning it.
There is no requirement in the law that the property has to be a substantial part of the
representation in order to be the subject of such for lien rights.
Moreover, even if the court found that one conversation about how title to the
property should be held was not sufficient to make the property the subject of the
representation, Christensen's representation was otherwise connected to the divorce. The
home had been the central residence of this family for several years before and for
approximately 15 years after the divorce. Important findings in the divorce related to
custody and finances were connected with the real property in question. On issues of
custody, the stability of Rehn and the children, the connection to the neighborhood and
schools and the ability of Rehn to provide a suitable home for the children was
interconnected with this real property. On financial issues of the divorce, Rehn's ability to
pay alimony because of his expenses for housing and utilities particularly were connected to
this real property. Because the home location, contents, design, and costs were connected to
the divorce and at least to the appeal of alimony and child support, Christensen had a good
faith belief that the representation was connected to the real property in question.
Finally, and most obviously, there was also a written agreement between Rehn and
one of the Appellees explicitly creating a consensual lien. Rehn signed this agreement
Christensen relied on the agreement to give him a lien in his property. The insertion of the
lien on Rehn's residence in the agreement between the parties further shows that Rehn
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contemplated buying the real property in question. Also, the fact that Rehn did buy the
property further verifies that Christensen and Rehn discussed whether he should do so.
Long after Rehn signed the HNC retainer agreement, Christensen memorialized a discussion
between them about putting a lien on the property in order to pay Christensen's fee. This
was never opposed by Rehn and supports a conclusion that a consensual lien was originally
intended between the parties. In fact, Rehn started paying $125 a month and Christensen
waived interest for six months in acknowledgement of the parties' later agreement for
Christensen to affix the lien even though Rehn never signed the later agreement. Because
there is a written agreement to allow the specific lien that Christensen gave notice of, it
cannot be shown that he had knowledge that he was not entitled to assert a lien against
Rehn's property.
Because Christensen testified that he believed the lien to be valid and that testimony
was u.nrebutted, Rehn did not establish that Christensen had actual knowledge that he had
no right to a lien. Rehn failed to establish the elements of malice. Therefore, the slander of
title claim should be reversed.
D.

The district court's refusal to grant a directed verdict on the issue of malice
constitutes harmful error and should be reversed

Harmful errors are grounds to disturb the erroneous court order. U.R.C.P. 61. An
error is harmful if "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant." State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, ,r 4, 113 P.3d 998.
In this case, had the district court granted the directed verdict motion on malice,
Rehn's slander of title claim would have failed, and no judgment would have entered against
Appellees.
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III.

THE ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED WERE NOT REASONABLY
NECESSARY TO REMOVE APPELLEES' LIEN.
"In slander of title cases, attorney fees may be recovered as special damages if the

fees are reasonabfy necessary to remedy the disparagement of the plaintiffs title." Neff v. Ne.ff,
2011 UT 6, 179, 247 P.3d 380 (emphasis added). Determining what attorney fees are
allowable as "reasonably necessary" is difficult because Utah case law addressing the outer
limits of that precise phrase is either scarce or not sufficiently explicit.
A.

For attorney fees to be "reasonably necessary" to remedy a disparagement of
title, they should be reasonable in amount and be incurred to pursue a
reasonable method of remedying the disparagement.

Having found little case law expounding on what kinds of attorney fees are
reasonably necessary and what kinds are not reasonably necessary for purposes of special
damages in slander of title, Appellees propose that this Court construe "reasonably
necessary" as requiring that the attorney fees be both reasonable in amount and incurred to
pursue a reasonable method of remedying the disparagement of title.
An example of a reasonably necessary amount of attorney fees would be the amount
of attorney fees billed for a simple quiet title action where the attorney billed a commonly
acceptable rate and avoided inefficient tasks. But, the amount of attorney fees would not be
reasonably necessary if the attorney billed twenty times the average rate or was grossly
inefficient
As to reasonable methods to remedy disparagement, a method may be reasonably
necessary if the method can achieve the desired remedy on its own, if the cost/benefit ratio
associated with the method is appropriate, and if the method itself is acceptable in light of
the specific case and public policy.
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For example, where there is an unlawful property lien, a quiet title action is a
reasonably necessary method because the quiet title action, on its own, can force removal of
the lien. Moreover, there is no public policy against quiet title, though the cost/benefit ratio
may render the quiet title action superfluous where the plaintiff has other options that are
cheaper. 19
Other methods that cannot on their own force removal of a lien, that are otherwise
economically inefficient, or that are inappropriate should not qualify as being reasonably
necessary. Even if those methods do result in the lienholder voluntarily removing of the lien,
why should a slander of title defendant have to pay damages for those methods when a more
efficient and appropriate method to determine the parties' rights was available?
For example, if a plaintiff sues a lienholder for personal injury and demands release of
the lien as a condition for dismissal of the personal injury action, the personal injury lawsuit
is not a reasonably necessary method because it cannot result in the lienholder being forced
to remove the lien and might involve substantial costs that might have been avoided by
using a quiet title action.
Another example: if the plaintiff requires the testimony of an expert to win the quiet
title case, it would not be reasonably necessary for that plaintiff to hire an additional thirtynine experts to review and confirm the original expert's findings because the additional
experts provide little benefit for an astronomical cost.

For instance, in some cases, it may be far cheaper to pay off the lien and then sue under
slander of title to recover that money used to clear the lien. See, e.g., Huff v. Jennings, 459
S.E.2d 886, 892 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
19
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As to methods that would be against public policy, one such might involve criminal
or tortious acts of coercion. Such acts might scare the lienholder into releasing the lien and
might be cheaper than litigation (in the short run), but no court will award a slander of title
plaintiff the costs of performing criminal or tortious actions because such approaches are
patently unreasonable and unacceptable.

B.

The attorney fees "reasonably necessary" to remedy a disparagement of title
must be separated from the attorney fees that were not reasonably necessary
to remedy the disparagement of title.

The burden is on ·Rehn to demonstrate that expenses were reasonably necessary to
remedy a disparagement of title. 20 When the legal action that actually clears title is molded in
with other actions, some of which could have cleared title, some of which could not have
cleared title, and some of which are focused on collecting the attorney fees incurred to clear
title, Rehn must show with specificity what fees were incurred to remedy his claimed
disparagement of title. Utah case law establishes that attorney fees incurred to pursue the
slander of title action are per se ineligible to be awarded as damages in the slander of title
action. Thus, the requesting party must separate attorney fees for slander of title actions
from the fees reasonably necessary to remedy disparagement of title, even if incurred in the
same lawsuit.

20

See D£/lon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, ,r 36, 326 P.3d 656.

37
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1.

Slander of ti.tie attorney fees are per se not eligible as slander of ti.tie damages.

In Utah, attorney fees incurred to pursue a slander of title judgment are per se not
reasonably necessary to remedy a disparagement of title. 21 This result necessarily follows
from the American Rule:
The general rule for attorney fees in tort cases is that the parties are each
responsible for their own fees. Under this rule, commonly referred to as the
"American Rule," the prevailing party may generally only recover fees if a
statutory or contractual provision entitles that party to such an award. An
important corollary to this rule is that the fees employed to prove that one has
suffered as the result of a tort may not be counted as a component of the
damages. Were it otherwise, all attorney fees would be characterized as
damages, and the general rules would cease to have any effect.

Nejf,I 77 (addressing slander of title damages); accord Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405, 413
(M:e. 1996) (explicitly holding that attorney fees to pursue slander of title are not reasonably
necessary to remedy a disparagement of title and that awarding them would violate the
American Rule).
2.

Even ifincurred in the same lawsuit that clears ti.tie, attorney fees that were not
reasonab!J necessary to remedy the disparagement of ti.tie should not be awarded as
slander oftitle damages.

As noted above, in Utah, the attorney fees incurred for pursuing slander of title
cannot be included in a damage awards with the attorney fees reasonably necessary to
remedy disparagement of title. This suggests that Utah requires some sort of allocation
between separate causes of action. The language in Neff supports this proposition: "To the

extent that ... legal action is reasonably necessary to remove clouds from the party's title, the

21

Part of the support for this proposition is bare logic. A slander of title action, standing on
its own, does not remove an invalid lien. Thus, the expenses incurred to pursue the slander
of title cannot possibly be reasonably necessary to remedy a disparagement of title. In fact,
before there can be a meaningful slander of title claim, there must already be damages.

38
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

party may recover those attorney fees." Neff ,r 80 (emphasis added). By usmg the phrase "to
the extent," the Utah Supreme Court, in Neff, seems to be suggesting that a slander of title
plaintiff cannot collect for the entire lawsuit that results in remedy of the disparagement. Neff
seems to require that only the attorney fees for the portions of the lawsuit that are necessary
to remove the disparagement should be eligible as being awarded as damages for slander of
title. In this case, the disparagement was removed on February 7, 2013, and the property was
sold soon after without a cloud on the title.
The Utah Supreme Court was also looking for specificity in damages m another case:
"Absent a specific monetary loss flowing from a slander affecting the saleability or use of the
property, there is no damage." Bass v. Planned Management Serus., Inc., 761 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah
1988) (emphasis added) (concluding that since "plaintiffs' attorney fees were not incurred to
clear title or to undo any harm created by whatever slander of title occurred, there were no
special damages, and the award of attorney fees was gratuitous"). The Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine has explicitly spelled this theory out, saying, "It is the costs of prosecution of
the counts which cleared the fplaintiffj's title, i.e. the quiet title counts and the declaratory
judgment count which are appropriately characterized as 'special damages' and for which
[Defendant] should bear liability." Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405,413 (Me. 1996).
C.

The district court should have granted Appellees' request for JNOV or a new
trial on attorney fees because the jui:y awarded Rehn damages for attornev fees
that were not reasonably necessary to remedy the disparagement of title
caused by Appellees' lien.

Appellees preface their argument by marshallUlg the evidence supporting the jury's
decision and then proceed to argue why the jury's decision is insupportable.
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1.

Appellees hereby substantialfy marshal the evidence that, taken in the light most
favorable to Rehn, support an assertion that the amount of damages theJury
awarded were reasonab!J necessary to remedy the disparagement of title.

Rehn testified at trial that because Appellees would not release the lien, he was
compelled to go through an extensive and costly legal process. R. 3944:272. Rehn testified
that he incurred $77,752.29 in attorney fees, that the $77,752.29 was for removal of the lien,
that the amount was reasonable, and that he could not have removed the lien for a lesser
amount. R. 3944:299-300.
One of Rehn's attorneys testified that the billing and amounts were all reasonable and
part of an overall strategy with multiple pieces moving toward the same goal. R. 3945:82-88.
That attorney also testified that a $7,847.5022 motion to strike Christensen's declaration,
denied by the district court, was reasonable partially because it brought contradictions in
Appellees' prior statements to the district court's attention. R. 3945:101-02.

2.

Ma'!J portions of Rehn 1 attorney fies were per se not reasonab!J necessary to remedy
the lien disparaging the title to Rehn 1properry. For others, there is a lack of
evidence supportz'ng their necessiry.

As noted prior, the $77,752.29 awarded to Rehn included most of the attorney fees
he incurred from the time he engaged his attorneys' services up to the summary judgment
ruling. 23 See R. 3868. A substantial portion of these fees were not reasonably necessary to
remedy the disparagement ofRehn's title to his property. Thus, they should not have been
awarded to Rehn in a slander of title judgment.

See R. 3945:53.
In the summary judgment ruling, the district court invalidated Appellees' lien and granted
Rehn partial judgment on his slander of title claim, among other things. R. 1955-59.
22
23
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Some of the $77,752.29 was incurred to pursue Rehn's slander of title claim. The
slander of title claim was part of the original complaint that Rehn's attorneys drafted. No
doubt Rehn's attorneys researched slander of title before and after drafting the complaint.
They prepared for and successfully obtained a favorable summary judgment ruling. Under
Utah law, the fees incurred for pursuing a slander of title judgment are per se prohibited
from being included as damages in the slander of title judgment. No amount of evidence
that Rehn presented in meeting his burden to prove damages can support a determination
that it was reasonably necessary for Rehn to incur the slander of title attorney fees to remedy
a disparagement of title. As a matter of law, the jury should not have been permitted to
award Rehn the attorney fees he incurred for slander of title before the summary judgment
ruling. 24 Instead of denying Appellees' post-trial motion, the district court should have
ordered a new trial on the issue or otherwise modified the judgment.
Rehn incurred another substantial portion of the $77,752.29 to pursue matters not
reasonably necessary to remedy the disparagement caused by Appellees' lien. These matters
involved claims for ''bankruptcy, bar complaints, Utah's wrongful lien statute, civil
conspiracy, intentional interference with economic relations, promissory estoppel,
permanent injunctions after the lien had already been voided, [and] equitable estoppel .... "
R. 3659. Looking at Rehn's nearly decade-old bankruptcy case, considering bar complaints
against Christensen, and attempting to pursue the other listed causes of action25 are not

The jury was not permitted to award Rehn the attorney fees he incurred after the summary
judgment in which Appellees' lien was invalidated. R. 3868.
25 Even if wrongful lien cause of action was appropriate, the district court dismissed it
because of the statute of limitations. R 1955-59. Therefore, it could not have remedied the
disparagement. The request for permanent injunction was also unnecessary because once the
24
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reasonably necessary to remedy a disparagement of title. Moreover, slander of title plaintiffs
should be required to mitigate their damages somewhat by choosing reasonable and direct
methods to remedy the disparagement of their title. As the Utah Supreme Court phrased it

in Bass, those efforts were gratuitous.
Rehn also did not allocate $32,594.93 of the $77,752.29 and specify for what that
money was spent. Admittedly, there was testimony that all of the fees were reasonably
necessary and related to removing the lien, but as demonstrated in the preceding two
paragraphs, that cannot possibly be true. Portions of the $32,594.93 would have been spent
on matters discussed in the previous paragraph, like slander of title, that are, per se, ineligible
to be awarded as attorney fees. Because Rehn did not tie those fees directly to a method that
was reasonably necessary (or even successful) in remedying the disparagement of his title, the

jury should not have been allowed to consider those fees in making its award to Rehn. The
district court should have directed a verdict, granted Appellees' motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or ordered a new trial on the attorney fees issue.
Additionally, some of the attorney fees Rehn incurred, even if they are related to
removing Appellees' lien, are plainly unreasonable. Admittedly, the controlling standard of
review makes it difficult for Appellees to challenge the reasonableness of an attorney fee
amount if the attorney fee was incurred for a purpose that, as a matter of law, is conceivably
reasonably necessary to remedy a disparagement of title. This is because there was testimony
at trial that the amounts were reasonable and thus there exists a basis in evidence to support
the jury's determination. However, the assertion that it was reasonably necessary for Rehn to
lien is gone, it is gone. Slander of title allows damages to remove a disparagement of titlenot prevent future disparagements of title.
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incur $7,847.50 on a failed motion to strike Christensen's declaration is simply unsustainable.
One of Rehn's attorneys testified that the motion to strike was simply a pawn in the overall
strategy and that mostly, it brought alleged contradictions to the district court's attention.
Per se, it is not reasonably necessary to spend nearly $8,000 on an unsuccessful motion to
strike for the purpose of bringing a contradiction to the court's attention when a short
paragraph in one of the summary judgment memorandums would have sufficed. Even if
Rehn's attorney testified it was reasonably necessary for Rehn to incur this expense, such
testimony, in that specific context, should not qualify as a "basis in evidence" to support the
jury's verdict.
Many of the attorney fees Rehn incurred and for which the jury awarded him
damages were ineligible, as a matter of law, to remedy a disparagement of title. Even if Rehn
convinced the jury that his expenses were reasonable, Utah case law does not allow as
damages expenses not reasonably necessary to remedy a disparagement of title. The district
court should have granted Appellees' motion for JNOV or a new trial.
D.

The district court's refusal to grant Appellees' JNOV or new trial motion is
harmful error and should be reversed.

Harmful errors are grounds to disturb the erroneous court order. U.R.C.P. 61. An
error is harmful if "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant." State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, ,r 4, 113 P.3d 998.
In this case, the district court's erroneous ruling allowed a judgment for an inappropriate

amount of money to stand against Appellees. Therefore, the district court's erroneous ruling
constitutes harmful error, and this Court should reverse it and remand for appropriate
findings as to what Rehn's damages should be.
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RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S ISSUES

IV.

V4i

UTAH CODE§ 78B-5-826 DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE SLANDER OF
TITLE CLAIM BECAUSE NO PARTY ASSERTED A CONTRACT'S
ENFORCEABILITY AS A BASIS FOR RECOVERY THEREUNDER.
As per the reciprocal attorney fee statute, a Utah "court may award costs and attorney

fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any ... written contract" only
"when the provisions of the ... written contract ... allow at least one party to recover
attorney fees." Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-826. According to the Utah Supreme Court, "an
action is 'based upon' a contract under the statute if a 'party to the litigation assert[s] the
writing's enforceability as basis for recovery."' Hooban v. Unicity Int'l, Inc., 2012 UT 40, ,I 22,285
P.3d 766 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Bilanzjch v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, ,I 15,
160 P.3d 1041).
Under the reciprocal fee statute, the civil action is based upon a contract if a party
asserts the contract's enforceability as a basis for recovery. It was unnecessary for Rehn to
prove enforceability of a contract to prevail on slander of title because he needed only
establish damages from malicious publication of a false statement regarding title. Indeed,
Rehn did not attempt to prove the contract's enforceability as part of his case-in-chief.
Instead, he relied on Appellees' alleged judicial admission that there was no contract. See
R. 1955-59.

As is commonly done with contractual attorney fee awards, a court awarding attorney
fees under the reciprocal statute should differentiate between fees related to contractual
claims and fees related to other claims "for which there is no entitlement for attorney fees."

Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). See also Reighard v. Yates, 2012
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UT 45, ,r 41,285 P.3d 1168 (awarding defendant contractual attorney fees for successfully
defending contractual cause of action, but not awarding plaintiff any attorney fees despite
plaintiff prevailing on tort cause of action in the same case); McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes

Owners Ass'n, Inc., 2013 UT App 53, if123-25, 298 P.3d 666 (focusing on the nature of an
individual cause of action within the lawsuit when determining whether a party qualified for
an award of attorney fees under the reciprocal statute). To hold otherwise would encourage
prospective plaintiffs to assert one cause of action based on a contract containing an
attorney fee provision and then take a free ride for as many causes of action as could be
vaguely related to the contractual claim and joined to the case. Cj Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52,
56 (Utah 1998) (espousing a desire to avoid free rides against all defendants based on a
substantial claim against one defendant). Additionally the word "action" in the statute should
be related to "cause of action" instead of to entire lawsuits where multiple causes of action
and parties may be joined.
Rehn is requesting attorney fees he incurred after the Court entered its summary
judgment order disposing of Appellees' contractual counterclaim and granting Rehn's
declaratory relief/ quiet title claim. R. 3323-3407. But, all litigation occurring after entry of
that order was limited to the slander of title and estoppel claims, the latter of which Rehn
withdrew26 following a favorable jury verdict.
Appellees acknowledge that they asserted the existence of a contract in multiple
instances and at multiple stages of the litigation. Indeed, Appellees sought to enforce the
contract through their counterclaim, which was dismissed on summary judgment. R. 1955Because Rehn withdrew this claim, and technically did not prevail, it should not eligible for
an award of attorney fees.

26
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59, 3618. Later, Appellees asserted the contract's existence to prove a lack of the malice
requisite for a slander of title claim. At that point, proving the contract's existence could
serve no other purpose because there was no surviving counterclaim or hope of recovery for
the Appellees under the contract. Indeed, the best possible outcome for Appellees was
dismissal of Rehn's claims. 27 Therefore, Appellees' post-summary judgment assertions
regarding a contract were made as a basis for dismissal of Rehn's claims. The contractual
assertions were not for any sort of recovery, which would have been required to invoke the
reciprocal statute. 28 Even if the jury had concluded that the contract existed and should have
been enforced, the jurors could not award damages under the contract because the contract
claims were already adjudicated.
The reciprocal statute also requires that the provisions of the written contract allow at
least one party to recover attorney fees. 29 The contract in question in this case allows the
prevailing party to recover attorney fees only "[ijn the event legal action is taken to enforce
27

On page 16 of his opening brief, Rehn asserts that if "Christensen had prevailed in that
defense, Rehn would have been forced to reimburse Christensen's attorney fees .... " Rehn's
statement demonstrates that Rehn is confusing counterclaims with mere defenses to claims
and is not differentiating between claims where a contract is a basis for recovery and claims
where a contract is irrelevant to the basis for recovery. If Appellees had prevailed on their
contractual counterclaim, which was dismissed at summary judgment, Rehn would have
owed attorney fees to Appellees because the enforceability of the contract would have been
the basis for Appellees' recovery. But, if Appellees had successfully countered Rehn's slander
of title claim with their "contract, thus no malice" defense, Rehn would have owed no
attorney fees because no party had asserted enforceability of the contract as a basis far recovery
before the jury. Conversely, Appellees should owe no attorney fees to Rehn, even though he
prevailed on slander of title, because no party asserted enforceability of the contract as a basis
far recovery.
28 Appellees' contractual assertions did not change the fundamental nature of Rehn's tort
cause of action, and they did not revive a previously dismissed counterclaim.
29 It should be noted that, as per the statute, it is the provisions of the written contract that
trigger the reciprocal award of attorney fees. Thus, Rehn's reasoning that Appellees could
trigger the reciprocal award through their pleadings is faulty.
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[the] agreement." R 338. No language in the agreement allowed for recovery of attorney fees
in the event that a party pursued claims other than those related to enforcing the contract.
Therefore, any attorney fees and costs associated with a cause of action not related to
enforcing the agreement fall outside of the scope of its attorney fee recovery paragraph.
Rehn is not entitled to a recovery under either the bare contract (which he argued did not
exist under Appellees' alleged judicial admission) or the reciprocal statute.
For these reasons, the Court should affirm the district court's denial of Rehn's
request for attorney fees.

V.

THE DISTRICT COURT IN NO WAY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT DECLINED TO EXERCISE ITS EQUITABLE POWER TO
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES.
"In general, Utah follows the traditional American rule that attorney fees cannot be

recovered by a prevailing party unless a statute or contract authorizes such an award." Hughes
v. Caffarry, 2004 UT 22, ,r 21, 89 P.3d 148. Admittedly, "a court has inherent equitable power

to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest[s] of justice
and equity." Id. (quoting Stewart v. Utah Pub. Sero. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994)). A
district court's decision regarcling such equitable awards is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Id.

,r 20. The Utah Supreme Court has used the phrases "considerable latitude" and

"exceedingly broad" when referring to a district court's discretion in this type of matter. Id.
Utah accords this discretion to the district court for good reason. The district court is "in the
best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as
a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to gamer from a cold record." Id.
n.2 (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)).
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Moreover, it should be noted that when "principles of equity confront rules of law,
'equity follows the law."' Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 649,651 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting
another source). As discussed supra in Part III of this brief' s argument and as briefly noted
above in this section, as per the American Rule, attorney fees incurred to pursue a slander of
title action are per se not recoverable as damages. If a court decided to award those attorney
fees anyway, it would be flying in the face of established case law and thus by definition, not
acting in an equitable manner.
In this case, Rehn argues that the district court, in an abuse of discretion, ignored
Appellee Christensen's status as Rehn's former attorney when deciding whether to award
equitable attorney fees for a slander of title trial. This simply is not true. In ruling on Rehn's
motion,Judge Harris stated, "And I certainly appreciate the fact that the jury found that Jv.(r.
Christensen had acted with malice and that Mr. Christensen did ... some things .... [I]he
jury found that he acted ... with malice and that's kind of a big deal." 30 R. 3942:56.
Moreover, Rehn's memorandum supporting his motion was before the district court and
apparently given due consideration. R. 3323-36.
The district court was not ignoring any fact Rehn was using to argue in favor of an
equitable award of attorney fees. Judge Harris' s decision was not an abuse of discretion.
Having considered Rehn's arguments for attorney fees, having presided over the entirety of
the proceedings, and having sat through trial and listened to witness testimony,Judge Harris
weighed the equities and saw no reason to award Rehn his attorney fees. In addition to the

30

Admittedly, the judge did not state that he explicitly understood that Christensen had been
Rehn's attorney at a prior time, but he was fully aware of that fact, having sat through the
trial and presided over all the litigation leading up to trial.
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absence of a statute or a contract allowing attorney fees on Rehn's slander of title cause of
action, there are a number of factors supporting Judge Harris's conclusion.
For instance, the debt in the Appellees' lien notice was not imaginary. Christensen
had previously represented Rehn on divorce and on appeal. Rehn had owed Christensen tens
of thousands of dollars that he never paid. Further, Rehn had not moved for an award of
attorney fees when the district court's order disposed of Appellees' contractual counterclaim.
That would have been the appropriate time to raise any claims that the prevailing party is
entitled to attorney fees.
A review of the docket in this case (or record index) reveals little to support Rehn's
assertion that Christensen, an attorney, was attempting to "exhaust his former client in
litigation." Appellees filed an answer and simple counterclaim. They opposed Rehn's motion
for summary judgment with their own motion for summary judgment. After losing on
summary judgment, Appellees exercised their constitutional right to a jury trial after
unsuccessfully attempting to dispose of the final claims on summary judgment. Rehn is the
party pursuing this litigation past summary judgment. Christensen is only defending against
Rehn's claims. Rehn has asserted that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
consider Christensen's malice toward a former client. As quoted above, the district court
considered precisely that fact and others before making its decision. Although Rehn has
attributed to Christensen the basest possible motives, there remains the fact that the district
court did not adopt Rehn's assertions as findings of fact. The facts found to be undisputed
on summary judgment were limited. See R. 1955-59. Likewise, the jury's findings of malice
and damages were conclusionary. R. 3161-62. The official findings of fact on the record
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show that a rational judge could weigh the equities and decline to award attorney fees.
Therefore, the district court's decision to not award attorney fees should be affirmed.

VI.

REHN IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES FOR HIS APPEAL
BECAUSE HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES BELOW.
Rehn argues that those entitled to attorney fees below are entitled to attorney fees on

appeal. But, as previously discussed, neither the reciprocal attorney fee statute nor the
district court's ability to make an equitable award of attorney fees entitles Rehn to an award
of attorney fees in this case. Therefore, Rehn is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The district court should have concluded that either an attorney's lien, a consensual
lien, or both existed and dismissed Rehn's slander of title action. Additionally, there should
have been no finding of malice because no evidence demonstrated that Christensen or any
Appellee knew that there was no right to a lien against Rehn. Even if the this Court affirms
the district court's decisions on the existence of a lien and malice, it should remand for a
recalculation of damages because the jury awarded Rehn damages for attorney fees that were
not reasonably necessary to remove Appellees' lien from his property.
As to Rehn's claims on appeal, this Court should affirm the district court in denying
Rehn attorney fees as prevailing party under the reciprocal attorney fee statute because
Rehn's slander of title claim did not involve any assertions as to the enforceability of a
contract as a basis for recovery. Moreover, Appellees' defense of a contract does not put the
case under the reciprocal award statute because the assertion of existence of contract was to
be a basis for dismissal, not recovery.
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The district court further did not abuse its discretion in declining to make an
equitable award of attorney fees because it considered the facts of this case fully. Moreover,
equity follows the law or fills in the gaps between laws-it is not an exception to an
otherwise prevailing law. An equitable award of fees in this case would run contrary to the
American Rule, which has been held specifically to apply to slander of title cases and which
requires that parties to litigation bear their own costs. Additionally, because Rehn is not
entitled to attorney fees below, he is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellees request that this Court
reverse the district court's slander of title judgment, affirm its denial of Rehn's attorney fees,
and order that this case be dismissed with prejudice. Alternatively, if this Court concludes
that dismissing the slander of title judgment is inappropriate, Appellees' request that this case
be remanded to recalculate Rehn's damages.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day ofJanuary, 2016.

CHRISTENSEN LAW

Clinton R. Brimhall
Jeremy R. Miller
Attorneys far Appellees and Cross-Appellants
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ADDENDUM
Appellees have inserted record page numbers on the bottom-right of pages extracted
from the record and reproduced herein. The record numbers are based on the record index
filed by the district court clerk on July 17, 2015.
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§ 38-2-7. Compensation--Attorney's lien, UT ST§ 38-2-7

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 38. Liens
Chapter 2. Miscellaneous Liens
U.C.A.1953 § 38-2-7
§ 38-2-7. Compensation-Attorney's lien

Currentness
(1) The compensation of an attorney is governed by agreement between the attorney and a client, express or
implied, which is not restrained by law.

(2) An attorney shall have a lien for the balance of compensation due from a client on any money or property
owned by the client that is the subject of or connected with work performed for the client, including:

(a) any real, personal, or intangible property that is the subject of or connected with the work performed for
the client;

(b) any funds held by the attorney for the client, including any amounts paid as a retainer to the attorney by
the client; and

(c) any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment in the client's favor in any matter or action in which
the attorney assisted, including any proceeds derived from the matter or action, whether or not the attorney is
employed by the client at the time the settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment is obtained.

(3) An attorney's lien commences at the time of employment of the attorney by the client.

(4)(a) An attorney may enforce a lien under this section by:

(i) moving to intervene in a pending legal action:

(A) in which the attorney has assisted or performed work; or

(B) in which the property subject to the attorney's lien may be disposed of or otherwise encumbered; or

(ii) by filing a separate legal action.

(b) An attorney may not move to intervene in an action or file a separate legal action to enforce a lien before
30 days has expired after a demand for payment has been made and not been complied with.

c1al!\ODE~HaUM.bovernment Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Westlavv-Nexr © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No

§ 38-2-7. Compensation--Attomey's lien, UT ST§ 38-2-7

(5) An attorney may file a notice oflien:

(a) in a pending legal action in which the attorney has assisted or performed work for which the attorney has
a lien under this section;

(b) with the county recorder of the county in which real property that is subject to a lien under this section
is located; or

(c) with the state or federal government office that receives filings that relate to the ownership of the property.

(6) A notice oflien described in Subsection (5) shall include the following:

(a) the name, address, and telephone number of the attorney claiming the lien;

(b) the name of the client who is the owner of the property subject to the lien;

(c) a verification that:

(i) the property is the subject of or connected with work performed by the attorney for the client; and

(ii)(A) the attorney made a demand for payment of the amounts owed to the attorney for the work and the
client did not pay the amounts owed within 30 days after the day on which the attorney made the demand; or

(B) the attorney is filing the notice of lien in accordance with a written agreement between the attorney

and the client;

(d) the date on which the attorney first provided services to the client;

(e) a description of the property, sufficient for identification;

(f) the signature of the attorney claiming the lien; and

(g) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents.

(7) Within 30 days after the day on which the notice of lien is filed, the attorney shall deliver or mail by certified
mail to the client a copy of the notice of lien.

V\l~·;rlE;it,•Next © 204 6 Thomson Reuters. No
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§ 38-2-7. Compensation--Attomey's lien, UT ST§ 38-2-7

(8) Any person who takes an interest in any property, other than real property, that is subject to an attorney's lien
with actual or constructive knowledge of the attorney's lien, takes the interest subject to the attorney's lien.

(9) An attorney's lien on real property has as its priority the date and time when a notice of lien is filed with the
county recorder of the county in which real property that is subject to a lien under this section is located.

(10) This section does not alter or diminish in any way an attorney's common law retaining lien rights.

( 11) This section does not authorize an attorney to have a lien in the representation of a client in a criminal matter
or domestic relations matter where a final order of divorce has not been secured unless:

(a)(i) the criminal matter has been concluded or the domestic relations matter has been concluded by the securing
of a final order of divorce; or

(ii) the attorney/client relationship has terminated; and

(b) the client has failed to fulfill the client's financial obligation to the attorney.

Credits
Laws 2001, c. 4, §§ I, 2, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2001, c. 360, § I, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2015, c. 168,
§ 1, eff. May 12, 2015.

Notes of Decisions (54)
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-2-7, UT ST§ 38-2-7
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End or Document
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§ 38-12-103. Failure to notify-Effect-Penalty, UT ST§ 38-12-103

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 38. Liens
Chapter 12. Notice of Lien Filing
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-12-103
§ 38-12-103. Failure to notify--Effect--Penalty

Currentness
(l)(a) A person who fails to meet the notice requirements of Subsections 38-12-102(1) and (2) is precluded from
receiving an award of costs and attorneys' fees from the person against whom a notice of lien has been filed in an
action to enforce the lien if costs and attorneys' fees are authorized by contract or statute.

(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not create a right to costs and attorneys' fees.

(2) In addition to the penalties provided in Subsection (l)(a), a lien claimant who, within 20 days from the date
ofreceiving notice of noncompliance with the notice requirements of Subsection 38-12-102(1) or (2), willfully
refuses to release the notice oflien or record the lien in compliance with Section 38-12-102 is liable to the person
against whom the notice of lien was filed for $1,000 or for treble damages, whichever is greater.

(3) Failure to meet the notice requirements of Subsections 38-12-102(1) and (2) does not

(a) invalidate any lien arising at common law or in equity or by any statute of this state; or

(b) affect the rules of priority provided in Title 70A, Chapter 9a, Uniform Commercial Code--Secured
Transactions.

Credits
Laws 1995, c. 323, § 3, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 2000, c. 252, § 7, eff. July 1, 2001.

U.C.A. 1953 § 38-12-103, UT ST§ 38-12-103
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End of Document
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§ 38-12-102. Notice requirements for lien filings--Exceptions, UT ST§ 38-12-102

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 38. Liens
Chapter 12. Notice of Lien Filing
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-12-102
§ 38-12-102. Notice requirements for lien filings-Exceptions

Currentness
(1) A lien claimant or the lien claimant's agent shall send by certified mail a written copy of a notice of lien to
the last-known address of the person against whom the notice of lien is filed no later than 30 days after the day
on which the notice of lien is submitted for recording with:

(a) a county recorder;

(b) a county clerk;

(c) a clerk of the court; or

(d) in the case of a lien on an aircraft under Section 38-13-201, the Federal Aviation Administration.

(2)(a) A notice oflien submitted for recording shall contain the following information:

(i) the name and address of the person against whom the lien is filed;

(ii) a statement that the property owned by the person against whom the lien is filed is subject to a lien;

(iii)(A) the amount of the judgment, settlement, or compromise, if the lien is based on a charge against or
interest in a judgment, settlement, or compromise;

(B) the amount of state taxes owed, if the lien is based on unpaid state taxes;

(C) the total amount of the unpaid assessment that is subject to the lien, including any fees, charges, or
costs, if the lien is based on an unpaid assessment under Title 57, Chapter 8, Condominium Ownership
Act, or Title 57, Chapter 8a, Community Association Act; or

(D) the amount of the unpaid fine, if the lien is based on an unpaid fine under Title 57, Chapter 8,
Condominium Ownership Act, or Title 57, Chapter 8a, Community Association Act; and
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§ 38-12-102. Notice requirements for lien filings-Exceptions, UT ST§ 38-12-102

(iv)(A) the name, address, and phone number of the lien claimant; or

(B) if the lien claimant has a representative for purposes of the lien, the name of the lien claimant and the
name, address, and phone number of the lien claimant's representative.

(b) When a lien claimant mails a copy of a notice of lien to the person against whom the notice of lien is filed,
in accordance with Subsection (1), the notice oflien shall contain:

(i) the requirements described in Subsection (2)(a);

(ii) the date the notice of lien was submitted for recording; and

(iii) the article number on the certified mail receipt.

(3) The notice requirements of Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to:

(a) a preconstruction or construction lien as provided in Title 38, Chapter la, Preconstruction and Construction
Liens;

(b) a lessors' lien as provided in Title 38, Chapter 3, Lessors' Liens;

(c) a federal tax lien as provided in Title 38, Chapter 6, Federal Tax Liens;

(d) a hospital lien as provided in Title 38, Chapter 7, Hospital Lien Law;

(e) a self-service storage facilities lien as provided in Title 38, Chapter 8, Self-Service Storage Facilities;

(f) an oil, gas, or mining lien as provided in Title 38, Chapter 10, Oil, Gas, and Mining Liens;

(g) a claim against the Residence Lien Recovery Fund as provided in Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act;

(h) a trust deed;

(i) a mortgage;

(j) any interests subject to a security agreement as defined in Section 70A-9a-l 02;

\l'lestlav1fNexr © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No c1ali\ODE~DUJ\&.23overnment Works.
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§ 38-12-102. Notice requirements for lien filings-Exceptions, UT ST§ 38-12-102

(k) any other liens subject to the same or stricter notice requirements than those imposed by Subsections (1)
and (2); or

(l) a court judgment or abstract of a court judgment presented for recording in the office of a county recorder.

Credits
Laws 1995, c. 323, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 2000, c. 252, § 6, eff. July 1, 2001; Laws 2001, c. 370, § 3, eff.
July 1, 2002; Laws 2005, c. 187, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2012, c. 278, § 69, eff. May 8, 2012; Laws 2014,
c. 129, § 1, eff. May 13, 2014.

·iiJ

U.C.A. 1953 § 38-12-102, UT ST§ 38-12-102
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End of Document
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ADDENDUM 3: Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826
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§ 788-5-826. Attorney fees-Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees, UT ST § 78B-5-826

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 5. Procedure and Evidence
Part 8. Miscellaneous (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A 1953 § 78B-5-826
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-56.5
§ 78B-5-826. Attorney fees-Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees

Currentness
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory
note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note,
written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney fees.

Credits

Laws 2008, c. 3, § 858, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.

Notes of Decisions (61)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-5-826, UT ST§ 78B-5-826

Current through 2015 First Special Session
End of Document
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Wrona Gordon & DuBois, P.C.

Joseph E. Wrona (#8746)
wrona(a)wronalawfirm.com
Jared C. Bowman (#11199)
bowman<@wronalawfirm.com
1745 Sidewinder Drive
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (435) 649-2525
Facsimile: (435) 649-5959
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES C. REHN, an individual; and
that certain real property located at 4118
SADDLEBACK ROAD, PARK CITY,
UTAH

Plaintiffs,

ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOTIONS

V.

STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, an individual;
STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, P.C., a Utah
professional corporation; HENROID,
NIELSEN, & CHRISTENSEN, a Utah
general partnership; CHRISTENSEN,
CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC, a Utah

Case No. 130500115

professional limited liability company;
HIRSCID CHRISTENSEN, PLLC, a Utah

professional limited liability company; and

The Honorable Ryan M. Harris

ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO
CLAIM ANY INTEREST IN THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION.
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Defendants.

The parties in this matter submitted cross-motions for summary judgment, and the Court issued
notice that a hearing would take place at 9:00 a.m. on January 9, 2014 to consider those motions. At
9:00 a.m. on January 9, 2014, Joseph Wrona appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, but no one was
present on behalf of the Defendants. At approximately 9: 15 a.m., the Court telephoned counsel for
the Defendants, and counsel for the Defendants stated that he was unaware of the scheduled hearing.
The parties, and the Court, all discussed whether to proceed with the hearing, and the Court
rescheduled the commencement of the hearing to 10:00 a.m. in order to give Defendants' counsel an
opportunity to travel to Court.
At 10:00 a.m. on January 9, 2014, the Court reconvened the previously scheduled hearing,
and Mr. Wrona was again present in Court on behalf of the Plaintiffs, and Mr. David M. Corbett
was present on behalf of the Defendants. The Court stated that during the recess that it had
researched the manner in which notice of the hearing had been distributed, and had confirmed that
proper notice had been issued to at least one of the Defendants' attorneys ofrecord in this matter.
The Court then proceeded to hear oral argument on the motions for summary judgment, but the
Court did not expressly ask for oral argument on Plaintiffs motion to strike portions of the
declaration of Steve Christensen. At the conclusion of oral argument, the Court issued an oral
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ruling from the bench.
The Court found that the following facts are undisputed:

1. The vast majority of the legal work performed by Defendant Steve Christensen for
Plaintiff Charles Rehn related to Mr. Rehn' s divorce;
2. There was no real property at issue at issue in the divorce;
3. At most, and viewing all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the Defendants,

Mr. Christensen provided $30.00 of billable time work that could arguably be related to a decision
by Mr. Rehn to purchase 4118 Saddleback Road (the "Property") some date in the future;
4. All other billable work was unrelated to the Property;
5. Utah's attorney lien statute does not authorize attorneys to record an attorney's lien
against property for amounts owed to an attorney that are unrelated to the property in question;
6. The Henriod, Nielsen & Christensen ("HNC") representation agreement with Mr. Rehn
includes a phrase that recites HNC's right to record a lien pursuant to Utah's attorney lien statute;
7. The fact that the Defendants have judicially admitted that there was no contractual right to
record a lien reinforces the Court's conclusion regarding the interpretation of the HNC
representation agreement.
In light of these undisputed facts, the Court makes the following conclusions of law:
1. The Court grants summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff regarding Count I of the
Plaintiffs Complaint, and the Court construes Count I of the Plaintiffs Complaint as a Quiet Title
claim. The Court concludes that there is no statute of limitations that applies to a Quiet Title claim,
and even if one of the Defendants originally had the right to record a lien against the property in the
amount of $30.00, it is undisputed that Mr. Rehn paid Defendants more than $30.00 after that
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purported work was performed and prior to the recording of the lien. Therefore, the Court grants
summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on Count I of their Complaint, and the Court quiets title
and renders the lien void. The Court orders the $40,000 currently held in escrow to be immediately
released to Mr. Rehn or to Wrona, Gordon & DuBois.
2. With regard to Count II of Plaintiffs Complaint, the claim set forth in Count II of that
Complaint is mooted by the Court's ruling and by the prior temporary relief granted in this case
releasing the lien in consideration of the escrowing of $40,000 in sale proceeds.
3. With regard to Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court denies summary judgment to
either party on that Count and finds that issues of fact exist with regard to the Defendant's intent
when the lien was recorded. Therefore, Count III can only be resolved through a trial on the merits.
4. With regard to Count IV of Plaintiffs Complaint, the Court denies each of the Parties'
motions for summary judgment on that Count and finds that genuine issues of fact exist regarding
the interpretation of the letter issued by Mr. Christensen to Mr. Rehn, and regarding the running of
any applicable statute of limitations.
5. With regard to Count V of Plaintiffs Complaint, the Court finds that Count Vis barred by
the statute of limitations and grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment and orders the
dismissal of Count V of Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice.
THEREFORE, Plaintiffs summary judgment motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART, as set forth herein. Defendants' summary judgment is also GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART, as set forth herein. The Court FURTHER ORDERS that the $40,000 currently
held in escrow be released to Mr. Rehn and/or his attorneys of record, and the Court directs the title
company holding that money in escrow to release to the escrowed amount immediately. Plaintiffs'
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Motion to Strike portions of Mr. Christensen's declaration is DENIED.
Tf?.e Court has reviewed Defendants' objection to the form of this order and has made
appropriate modifications.

ADDENDUM4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
January 221 2014 02:11 PM
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

R.01959
5 of 5

ADDENDUM 5: FinalJudgment

ADDENDUM5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THIRD DISTRICT COURT· SUMMIT

·JAN
FILED ll't

-·s 2015

\ ,.\\J A·Wl.

lli½,i

WRONA GoRDON & DUBolS, P.C.
Joseph E. Wrona (#8746)
wrona@wgdlawfirm.com
Jared C. Bowman (#11199)
bgwmap@wgdlawfirm.com
1745 Sidewinder Drive
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (435) 649-2S2S
Facsimile: (435) 649-S959
AJtorneysfor Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRicr COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES C. REHN, an individual; and
that certain real property located at 4118
SADDLEBACK ROAD, PARK CITY,
UTAH

FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

v.
.smVE s. CHRISTENSEN, an. individual;
STEVES. CBRIS~SEN, P.C., a Utah
professional corporation; BENROID,
M.£LSEN, & CHRISTENSEN, a Utah
general partnersbip; CHRISTENSEN,
CORBEIT & PANKRATZ, PLLC, a Utah
professional limited liability company;
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC, a Utah
professional limited liability company; and
ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO·
CLAIM ANY INTEREST IN THE

Case No. 130500115
The Honorable Ryan M. Harris

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION.
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i

I

i .

Defendants.
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This matter came before· the Court for a jury trial on December 9-10, 2014, with David
M. Corbett of Christensen, Corbett & Pankratz., PLLC representing Defendant Steve S.

Christensen \'Christensen'') and Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Steve 8. _Christensen, P~C.
(''SSC"), and Joseph B. Wrona of Wrona, Gordon & DuBois, P.C. representing Plaintiff Charles

C. Rehn ("Rehn") and Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 4118 Saddleback Road, ParkCity, Utah
(the ''Property") (collectively, the "Plaintiffs'?, On December 9-10, 2014 the Parties 1ried_the

following issues to a jury: (1) whether Christensen and SSC act.ed with malice when they
recorded the Amended Notice of Attorney Lien, Entry No. 00594032, Bk. 01384, Pg. 00187 on
July 25, 200l(the "Lien'') against the Property; and (2) whether the Plmntiffs suffered damages,

and in what amount Prior to trial, the Court granted summary judgment; in favor of the J>labrtiffs
on the -~hlintiffs' cause of action for declaratory judgment, which the Court construed as a quiet

title action and deemed the Plaintiffs' cause- of action for an injunction moot. Prior to trial, the

Court also found that the Plaintiffs had established the first two elements· of their Slander of Title
claim as .a matter of Jaw. Prior to trial, the Court further dismissed the PlaintiJfs' claim for
wron!@ll lien as being outside the $tote of limitations.
• •I

I

On December 10, 2014, the jury in this action found that Christensen and SSC acted with

lilalice and the jury awarded $77,752.29 in consequential _damages. In the wale~ of that jury
verdict, the Plaintiffs withdrew their promissory estoppel claim in order to_ conserve the

resources of1he Court and the Parties.

2
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Ba.,ed upon the findings and conclusions of the Court and the Jury, THE COURT
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES 1HAT:
Tho P1aintiffs, First Cause of Action (Declaratory Judgment against All

1.

Defendants) was proven as a matter of law on January 22, 2014.
The Plaintiffst Second Cause of Action (Permanent Injmiction ·against All

2.

Defendants) 'WU disrnfS-cred with prejudice as moot on January 22, 2014.
The Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action (Slander of Trtle against Christensen and

3.

SSC) has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

4.

The Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action (Promissory Estoppel against Christensen

and SSC) has been withdrawn.
S,

The Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action (Wrongful !Jen against ~nsen and

SSC) was dismissed as a matter oflaw on January 22, 2014.
6.

SSC•s Fll'St -Qwse of Action (Enforcement of Lien Against the Saddleback

Property) was dismissed as a matter of law on January 22, 2014.

.

.

The Court therefore grants relief and money damages to the Plaintiffs on their

7.
.

.

.

Slander of Title Claim against Christensen and SSC in the following amounts:
a. $77,752.29, ~enting the special damages of attorney's fees and costs that

Rehn paid to remove the cloud.placed on his title by the Lien;

b. Post-Judgment Interest at the rate ofi!I&% per annum; and

.

2.211,

3@
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I
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;•

Q....

1

4 ddkigaal eeets end auemey fees as the _prer,'aiHBg pmty

s~=====-~-o-... @

'f

8.

emetmt of s,__

.

The total amount of the monetary j~ent awarded to Rehn is $77,752.~ plus-

lbe addm:eB&I eeotB and attomc1s' fees
•·

m the

to

@

in the amouat of$_ _ _ _ _ :far totm award of Q.

$ .

l

I
f

BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to 'the following
people for case 130500115 by the method and on the date specified.

MANUAL EMAIL:

DAVID M CORBETT dmc@ccplawyers.com

MANUAL EMAIL:

JOSEPH E WRONA

wrona@wgdlawf irm. com

/s/ BRIDGETTE BLONQUIST

01/08/2015

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION

I certify that a copy of this document was sent to the following people
for case 130500115 by the method and on the date specified.
CORBETT dmc@ccplawye:rs.com
E WRONA wrona®wgdlawf irm. com

MANUAL EMAIL:

DAVID M

MANUAL

JOSEPH

EMAIL:

01/08/2015

/s/ BRIDGETTE BLONQUIST

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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ADDENDUM 6: Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict, Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, or Motion for New Trial
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David M. Corbett (U.S.B. No. 13946)
dmc@ccpla"WVers.com
Craig L. Pankratz (U.S.B. No. 12194)
CHRISTENSEN CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC
340 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 303-5800

Attornrysfar Steve 5. Christensen, Steve 5. Christensen, P.C., Christensen Corbett & PankratZ; PLLC, and
Hirschi Christensen, PLLC
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SU:M1vilT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES C. REHN, an individual; and that
certain real property located at 4118
SADDLEBACK ROAD, PARK CITY,
UTAH

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE

VERDICT, MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT, OR MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 130500115

v.

STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN, an individual;
STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, P.C., a Utah
professional corporation; HENROID,
NIELSEN, & CHRISTENSEN, a Utah
general partnership; CHRISTENSEN,
CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC, a Utah

Judge Ryan Harris

professional limited liability company;

HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC, a Utah
professional limited liability company; and ALL
UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO CLAIM
ANY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE ACTION.
Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants, Steve S. Christensen and Steve S. Christensen, P.C. (collectively
"Steve"), and submit this memorandum in support of motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, motion to alter or amend judgment, and motion for a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs filed their Verified Complaint on February 15, 2013. The complaint asserted

five causes of action: (1) A declaratory judgment seeking a judgment that the lien was unenforceable
and void ab initio; (2) A permanent injunction prohibiting efforts to enforce the lien; (3) Slander of
Title; (4) Estoppel; and (5) Wrongful Lien.
2.

Steve filed a counter-claim seeking enforcement of his attorney lien.

3.

On February 26, 2013, the Court issued a temporary restraining order vacating Steve's

attorney lien that would be effective once Plaintiffs posted a $40,000 bond.
4.

On March 11, 2013, the Court entered a preliminary injunction that voided the lien

based on the stipulation of the parties after Plaintiffs placed $40,000 into escrow.
5.

On January 22, 2014, the Court entered its Order on Summary Judgment Motions. The

Court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff on his first cause of action (declaratory judgment) and
determined that the second cause of action (injunctive relief) was moot. The Court denied summary
judgment to either party on the slander of title cause of action because of the factual issues related to
Defendants' intent when the lien was recorded. The Court denied summary judgment on the
estoppel cause of action because of factual issues. And the Court dismissed the Wrongful Lien cause
of action.
6.

Plaintiffs also filed a motion to strike portions of Steve's declaration, which was denied.
ARGUMENT

The jury's verdict and the Court's judgment awarding Plaintiff $77,752.29 in consequential
damages are not supported by the evidence presented at trial on Plaintiff's claim for slander of title.
A court may enter judgment notwithstanding a jury's verdict, alter or amend its judgment, or grant a
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new trial if there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict. U.RC.P. SO(b) & 59(a)(6), (e). To
prevail on a claim for slander of title, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to prove that a
slanderous statement caused special damages. Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, ,r 79, 247 P.3d 380. Attorney
fees are special damages caused by a slanderous statement if they were "reasonably necessary ... to
remove the doubt cast upon vendibility or value by disparagement." Id. at ,r 82. Therefore, before a
plaintiff may award attorney fees for slander of title, the evidence must be sufficient to prove that (1)
his requested award of attorney fees was actually incurred to remove the doubt cast upon vendibility
or value of property by disparagement and (2) the attorney fees are reasonable.

I. Plaintiff failed to prove that $43,916.43 of his requested costs and attorney fees were actually
incurred to remove Steve's attorney lien.
The evidence was insufficient to prove that Plaintiff incurred $77,752.29 in costs and
attorney fees to remove the doubt cast the vendibility or value of his property by Steve's attorney
lien. The Utah Supreme Court has held,

An award of attorney fees must be based on the evidence and supported by findings
of fact. ... One who seeks an award of attorney fees, therefore, has the burden of
producing evidence to buttress the requested award. . . . When the evidence
presented is insufficient, an award of attorney fees cannot stand. . . . In this regard,
. . . a party seeking attorney fees must allocate its fee request according to its
underlying claims.

Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). If a plaintiff fails to allocate fees in whole or in part, an
award of attorney fees should be denied or reduced accordingly. See Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App
318, 1J 42, 35 P.3d 341;Keith Jorgensen's, Inc. v. Ogden Ci!J Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128, 1J 32, 26 P.3d
872; A.K&R Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 87, 1J 33, 977 P.2d 518. And
"[w]hile a trial court may, in its discretion, deny fees altogether for failure to allocate, ... it may not
award wholesale all attorney fees requested if they have not been allocated as to separate claims
and/or parties." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998). Thus, to prove that attorney
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fees were caused by and reasonably necessary to remove doubt caused by a slanderous statement, a
plaintiff bears the burden to apportion or allocate the fees he incurred into three categories: (1) fees
incurred on successful claims for which attorney fees are recoverable, (2) fees incurred for
unsuccessful claims for which attorney fees are recoverable, an~ (3) fees incurred on unsuccessful
claims for which attorney fees are not recoverable. See Sumner Hill Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Rio Mesa

Holdings, ILC, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 139-40 (Ct. App. 2012); see also Foote, 962 P.2d at 55.
Plaintiff's evidence parti.ally allocates the attorney fees incurred in this matter. The partial
allocation of attorney fees reveals that the jury awarded attorney fees incurred working on Plaintiffs
unsuccessful claims and motions and on work performed for unrelated matters. It also reveals that
the jury awarded attorney fees where the evidence is insufficient to ascertain as to whether the fees
were incurred working on successful or unsuccessful claims. The Court should subtract the jury's
award of these fees from the judgment entered in this case.

A. The jury improperly awarded $11 321.50 in attorney fees for unsuccessful claims.
unsuccessful motions and work unrelated to removal of the lien.
The jury improperly awarded attorney fees for work Plaintiffs' attorneys performed related
to bankruptcy, bar complaints, Utah's wrongful lien statute, civil conspiracy, intentional interference
with economic relations, promissory estoppel, permanent injunctions after the lien had already been
voided, equitable estoppel, and an unsuccessful motion to strike Steve's declaration. Inasmuch as
this work was performed on unsuccessful claims, unsuccessful motions, claims unrelated to removal
of the lien, and/ or after the Court voided the lien, the attorney fees incurred were not reasonably
necessary to remove the lien. Therefore, the jury improperly awarded them to Plaintiffs, and this
Court should reduce the verdict and judgment accordingly.
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The following chart lists the work performed and attorney fees incurred on unsuccessful
claims, unsuccessful motions, and/ or claims unrelated to removal of the lien:
DATE

DESCRIPTION

Arn

HRS

RATE

AMT

Jan-07-13

Review docket ~om client's 2004 bankruptcy; pull
schedules to determine if attomey Christensen was

BCJ

.7

$90.00

$63.00

1.0

$195.00

$195.00

1.2

$195.00

$234.00

.30

$195.00

$58.50

.30
.10
.1

$195.00
$195.00
$195.00

$58.50
$19.50
$19.50

1.0
1.5

$195.00
$195.00

$195.00
$292.50

0.40

$195.00

$78.00

0.50

$195.00

$97.50

1.40

$195.00

$273.00

.7

$225.00

$157.50

.1
.20

$195.00
$195.00

$19.50
$39.00

.6
2.0

$195.00
$195.00

$117.00
$390.00

.3
.60

$195.00
$195.00

$58.50
$117.00

1.10

$225.00

$247.50

.1
.1
1.00

$215.00
$215.00
$215.00

$21.50
$21.50
$215.00

.5

$215.00

$107.50

Jan-25-13

Jan-28-13
lan-29-13

Feb-12-13

Feb-14-13
Feb-15-13
Feb-19-13
Feb-26-13

Mar-06-13
Mar-07-13
Jun-27-13

listed as creditor; pull Hirschi Christensen documents
from Division of Corporations to determine that
attorney Christensen was part of firm; meeting with J.
Wrona re: same.
Research existence of Steve S. Christensen,P.C. (0.8);
JCB
Research Steve Christensen's employment history (0.2).
Research attorney lien statute and legislative history for JCB
possible remedy to strike lien.
Begin researching possible remedies through
JCB
bankruptcy court.
Research abusive liens
JCB
Teleconference with Charlie reearding invoices
]CB
Review and analyze email from Charlie regarding
JCB
additional invoices
Evaluate invoices
JCB
Evaluate potential of striking attorney lien through
JCB
s ..............~ 1 proceedings for wrongful lien.
Research bankruptcy filings for additional evidence to
JCB
strike attorney lien.
Research case law regarding method of sanctioning
JCB
Christensen in bankruptcy court.
Continue researching wrongful lien case law and
JCB
statutes.
Attorney conference regarding the issues
]TC
related to the filing of a wrongful lien
injunction under Utah law and the factual
issues in the case (0. 7).
Research civil conspiracy as possible claim.
]CB
Begin researching cause of action for intentional
JCB
interference with economic relations.
Research additional causes of action.
TCB
Evaluate, research, and assess potential new theory of
JCB
wrongful lien.
Work with TTC on wron(?ful lien ar(?Wllents.
JCB
Begin drafting Proposed Wrongful Lien Injunction and JCB
Temporary Restraining Order.
Reviewed and analyzed the petition for wrongful lien
JTC
injunction and also conversed with Jared and Joe about
the process of filing a wrongful lien petition (1.1).
Email Charlie about the status of closing.
JCB
Email Charlie to follow-up on closing.
JCB
Research Christensen's argument regarding wrongful
JCB
lien claim.
Research elements of permanent injunction
JCB
and interplay with statute of limitations.
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Jul-03-13

Jul-23-13

Aug-28-13
Oct-17-13

Nov-01-13
Nov-04-13
Nov-07-13

Nov-14-13

Nov-15-13
Nov-19-13

Nov-20-13
Dec-10-13

Dec-12-13

Dec-13-13

Research case law regarding policy of promoting
alienability of land.
Research elements of promissory estoppel and
interplay with statute of limitations.
Research wrongful lien claim and interplay
with statute of limitations.
Research bankruptcv effect on lien.
Research case law regarding equitable estoppel
to include in Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Partial Summarv Judt?II1ent.
Work with estoppel doctrines as they relate to
summary judement motion.
Edit summary judgment to get wrongful lien
damages into brief; working on trebling
damages f.51
Begin evaluating possibility of motion to strike
Christensen's declaration.
Continue evaluating possibility of motion to strike
Christensen's declaration.
Review Bowman memo on striking portions of
Christensen affidavit; working w / Bowman on
structure of a motion to strike f.31
Begin drafting Memorandum. in Support of Motion to
Strike Portions of Christensen's Declaration.
Research case law reearding striking affidavit
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Strike Portions of Christensen's Declaration.
.Attorney conference regarding the issues surrounding a
claim of wrongful lien as they relate to the attorney's
lien filed in the case (0.7).
Draft Motion to Strike Portions of Christensen's
Declaration.
Draft Notice of Filing of Affidavit and of
Supplemental Authority.
Document review for documents produced to
compare to documents attached to defendants'
opposition to motion to strike; prepare
documents for Jared to review for his reply.
Review and analyze Defendants' Opposition to Motion
to Strike Portions of Christensen's affidavit.
Research past misconduct of Christensen.
Scrutinize Defendants' Opposition to Motion to Strike
and formulate counterarguments to
the same.
Begin drafting Reply in Support of Motion to
Strike Portions of Christensen's Declaration.
Work with DJO on drafting his affidavit to support
Reply in Support of Motion to Strike.
Editing reply to motion to strike f.61
Continue working on Reply in Support of Motion to
Strike.

JCB

.4

$215.00

$86.00

]CB

.5

$215.00

$107.50

JCB

.5

$215.00

$107.50

JCB
JCB

.5
0.70

$215.00
$215.00

$107.50
$150.50

]CB

.6

$215.00

$129.00

JEW

.5

$350.00

$175.00

]CB

.4

$215.00

$86.00

JCB

1.2

$215.00

$258.00

JEW

.3

$350.00

$105.00

]CB

4.60

$215.00

$989.00

JCB

]CB

.5
4.10

$215.00
$215.00

$107.50
$881.50

JTC

0.70

$225.00

$157.50

]CB

0.50

$215.00

$107.50

JCB

0.40

$215.00

$86.00

DJO

.9

$175.00

$157.50

JCB

1.00

$215.00

$215.00

JCB
JCB

0.70
0.80

$215.00
$215.00

$150.50
$172.00

]CB

6.60

$215.00

$1,419.00

JCB

0.10

$215.00

$21.50

JEW

.6
1.20

$350.00
$215.00

$210.00
$258.00

JCB
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Dec-14-13

Dec-16-13

Dec-17-13

Jan-8-14
Jan-14-14

Working on reply to motion to strike; working
on Christensen's penchant for constantly
misrepresenting facts f.41
Work with JEW on arguments for Reply in Support of
Motion to Strike.
Final edits to reply f.51
Document review of intial [sic.] disclosures, and
responses to discovery requests; compare
documents and find support for our reply in
support of motion to strike.
Finalize Reply in Support of Motion to Strike Portions
of Christensen's Declaration.
Draft Motion and Proposed Order for
Overleneth Reply Memorandum.
Prepare table of contents and table of authorities for
reply memorandum in support of motion to strike
Christensen Declaration.
Assist in preparing for hearing on motion to strike.
Research possible attorneys' fees exposure for
wrongful lien.

JEW

0.40

$350.00

$140.00

]CB

0.20

$215.00

$43.00

TEW
DJO

.5
1.4

$350.00
$175.00

$175.00
$245.00

]CB

2.50

$215.00

$537.50

]CB

0.40

$215.00

$86.00

BC]

1.10

$100.00

$110.00

TCB

2.80
0.20

$215.00
$215.00

$602.00
$43.00

]CB

53.6

TOTALS

$11,321.50

B. The jury improperly awarded $32 594.93 in costs and attorney fees because Plaintiffs failed
to allocate them.
Plaintiffs failed to allocate many of their costs and attorney fees. The failure to allocate
makes it impossible to determine whether they were incurred for successful or unsuccessful claims.
Because it is impossible to determine, Plaintiffs failed to prove that they were reasonably necessary
to remove the lien, and the Court must reduce the verdict and judgment accordingly.
The following chart summarizes the attorney fees that Plaintiffs failed to allocate:
DATE

DESCRIPTION

Jan-07-13

Correspond w / Charles; teleconference w /
Charles; teleconference w / Maria at title
company; review bankruptcy related issues
fl.01
Review and analyze email from client and forward
onto JEW for review
Attorney conference with Jared Bowman regarding the
facts and legal issues of client's case and provided
advice ... on matters of liens and wronclul liens (0. 7)
Email Charlie to update him on status of research and
progress in investigating the removal of Christensen's
Llen.
Begin reviewing and analvzine email from Charlie.

Jan-26-13
Jan-29-13

ATrY
JEW

HRS

RATE

1.0

$350.00

AMT
$350.00

]CB

.2

$195.00

$19.50

JTC

.7

$225.00

$157.50

]CB

0.40

$195.00

$78.00

JCB

0.20

$195.00

$39.00
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Jan-31•13

Feb-06-13

Feb-13-13

Feb-14-13
Feb-15-13

Feb-19-13

Feb-20-13

Feb-25-13

Received, reviewed and analyzed two cases
from Jared Bowan and conference [sic.] with rum
about the applicability of those cases to the
client's matter (1.4).
Work with JC on lien issues and potential
remedies.
Work with BKC on potential bankruptcy and
lien issues.
Review Christensen documents and working
on issues raised bv those documents r.41
Review and analyze letter and documents from
Steve S. Christensen
Teleconference with Charlie and follow•up email per
Charlie's request.
Beein drafting Verified Complaint.
Email update and letter to Charlie.
Editing complaint; working on what is needed
for preliminary injunction; revise complaint to
lay groundwork for preliminary injunction r.81
Review, analyze, and respond to Charlie's emails.
Continue working on the Verified Complaint.
Work with JEW on Verified Complaint and strategy.
Continue working on Verified Complaint.
Researched the issues and had an attorney conference
with Jared Bowman regarding the application of the
wrongful lien statute in light of the facts provided by
client pertaining to the time frame that he obtained the
property that is the subject of the lien (1.1).
Begin drafting Memorandum in Support of Wrongful
Lien Injunction and TRO.
Editing Court pleadings r.81
Continue working on Memorandum in Support
of Wrongful Lien Petition and TRO/Preliminary
Injunction.
Continue drafting Petition for Wrongful Lien
Injunction & Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction.
Prepare notice of lawsuit and request for
waiver of service of summons and waiver of
service of summons for all defendants; email
same to Christensen; look up client's property records
in Summit county to determine
ownership; review trust deed containing client
and wife's signatures; prepare power of
attorney; email same to client.
Editing memorandum for TRO; editing motion;
working on memo and motion for TRO r1.s1
Finalize Memorandum for TRO /Petition for
Wrongful Lien Injunction.
General hearing preparation for tomorrows [sic.]
hearing; outline basic arguments to make at tomorrows
rsic.1 hearing; check to determine whether opposition

JTC

1.40

$225.00

$315.00

JCB

.5

$195.00

$97.50

]CB

.3

$195.00

$58.50

JEW

.4

$350.00

$140.00

JCB

.9

$195.00

$175.50

]CB

.6

$195.00

$117.00

JCB
JCB
JEW

5.50
.4
.80

$195.00
$195.00
$350.00

$1,072.50
$78.00
$280.00

JCB
JCB
]CB
JCB
JTC

.80
2.4
.30
2.1
1.1

$195.00
$195.00
$195.00
$195.00
$225.00

$156.00
$468.00
$58.50
$409.50
$247.50

]CB

4.70

$195.00

$916.50

JEW

]CB

.8
2.3

$350.00
$195.00

$280.00
$448.50

]CB

.80

$195.00

$156.00

BCJ

1.3

$100.00

$130.00

JEW

1.80

$350.00

$630.00

]CB

2.20

$195.00

$429.00

JEW

2.00

$350.00

$700.00
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Feb-26-13

Feb-28-13
Mar-06-13
Apr-11-13

Apr-12-13

Apr-15-13

Mav-20-13
Jun-26-13
Jul-19-13

Jul-22-13

Jul-23-13

has been filed; pull cases and review cases; identify
need for case on uniqueness of real property;
researching whether opposing counsel is subject to bar
complaint (3 hours actual, cha.me 2 hours)r2.0l
Assist in preparations for Wrongful Lien/TRO
Hearing.
Prepare for hearing; reviewing brief; reviewing
exhibits; rev-iewing case law; reviewing
statutes; working on blow up; pulling excerpts
to provide to Court; preparing arguments;
travel to Court; obtain opposition and review
same; conduct Court hearing; working on
order after Court (8 hours actual, charge 6
hours) f6.0l
Assist in preparations for TRO/Wrongful Lien
Hearing.
Review and analyze opposition memorandum obtained
from Court's web site.
Meeting with Charlie regarding allegations in
Christensen's Opposition.
Working on closing; working on preliminary
injunction w / Tared f.41
Coordinate with staff on deadlines for
discovery and Reply to Counterclaim.
Email Answer and Counterclaim to Charlie for
review.
Review and analyze Answer and Counterclaim
Teleconference with Charlie regarding
responding to .Answer and Counterclaim.
Obtain and review Christensen's answer;
review Bowman's memo on motion to dismiss;
working on whether to file motion to dismiss
or whether to proceed with litieation Pl
Review counterclaim to determine whether
12(b)(6) motion should be filed; working on
strategy for s .................. v judement f.31
Respond to Charlie's email inquiries.
Begin researching case law regarding Christensen's
ar2Uffients in Opposition Memorandum.
Work with JEW on strategy for motion for partial
Suu.uu.uy jud21I1ent.
Begin drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Partial S-........ v lud21Ilent.
Formulating arguments for Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Partial Summary ludrnient.
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial Summarv ludrnient.
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial S................ v ludrnient.
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial S
ludrnient
Correspond w / client; working on Swrunarv judgment

JCB

.90

$195.00

$175.50

JEW

6.00

$350.00

$2,100.00

JCB

1.40

$195.00

$273.00

JCB

0.60

$195.00

$117.00

JCB

.40

$195.00

$78.00

JEW

.4

$350.00

$140.00

JCB

.2

$215.00

$43.00

JCB

.1

$215.00

$21.50

TCB
JCB

1.1
.2

$215.00
$215.00

$236.50
$43.00

JEW

.7

$350.00

$245.00

JEW

.3

$350.00

$105.00

TCB
JCB

.s
.5

$215.00
$215.00

$107.50
$107.50

JCB

.20

$215.00

$43.00

JCB

2.60

$215.00

$559.00

JCB

.5

$215.00

$107.50

JCB

2.50

$215.00

$537.50

JCB

2.60

$215.00

$559.00

JCB

4.40

$215.00

$946.00

JEW

.20

$350.00

$70.00

A.&.

Jul-24-13
Jul-25-13
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Jul-26-13

.Aug-12-13
.Aug-13-13
.Aug-14-13

.Aug-15-13

.Aug-16-13

.Aug-26-13

.Aug-27-13

.Aug-28-13

.Aug-29-13

Oct-17-13

Oct-29-13

Oct-31-13
Oct-31-13
Nov-01-13

r.21
Review, analyze and respond to Charlie's email
inquiries regarding items to be done and schedule of
events.
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial S.................... y Jude:ment.
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial Summarv Jude:ment.
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment against
Christensen et al.
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against
Christensen et al.
Work with JEW on ar2U111ents for Suirnu;uy judgment.
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial SummarvJude:ment.
Working on motion for sui.1u1=i.r judgment f.31
Teleconference with Charlie regarding Motion for
Partial Summarv Judgment and strategy.
Editing summarv judgment motion f.81
Review, analyze, and respond to email inquiries from
Charlie.
Two major edits to summary judgment motion;
working w / Bowman on additional facts and
weaving deposition testimony into summary
jude:ment motion fl.01
Two major edits to summary judgment motion;
working w / Bowman on additional facts and
weaving deposition testimony into summary judgment
motion fl.81
Working on s .............~, jude:ment motion f.41
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Partial S............. ~r Jude:ment.
Work with JEW on Motion for Partial Summary
Jud2I11ent.
Finalize Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
Draft Motion for Partial Summarv Judgment.
Compile specific exhibits for Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Partial S..u .............. y Judgment.
Review cross motion for summary judgment and work
w/ Jared on same f.31
Begin reviewing and analyzing Christensen's CrossMotion for Summary Judgment and accompanying
memorandum.
Formulate strategy for responding to Christensen's
Brief.
Begin scrutinizing Christensen's Opposition and
Memorandum supporting Cross-Motion.
Continue evaluating arguments in Christensen's
Memorandum.

JCB

.70

$215.00

$150.50

JCB

1.50

$215.00

$322.50

JCB

0.90

$215.00

$193.50

]CB

1.80

$215.00

$387.00

]CB

0.50

$215.00

$107.50

JCB

]CB

0.10
1.70

$215.00
$215.00

$21.50
$365.50

JEW
JCB

0.30
0.30

$350.00
$215.00

$105.00
$64.50

JEW
JCB

.8
0.30

$350.00
$215.00

$280.00
$64.50

JEW

1.00

$350.00

$350.00

JEW

1.8

$350.00

$630.00

JEW
JCB

.4

2.2

$350.00
$215.00

$140.00
$473.00

]CB

.2

$215.00

$43.00

JCB

1.4

$215.00

$301.00

JCB

.8

]CB

1.1

$215.00
$215.00

$172.00
$236.50

JEW

.3

$350.00

$105.00

]CB

1.2

$215.00

$258.00

JCB

.2

$215.00

$43.00

JCB

.9

$215.00

$193.50

JCB

1.0

$215.00

$215.00
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(&,

Nov-07-13

Nov-08-13

Nov-11-13

Nov-12-13

Nov-18-13

Nov-19-13

Continue formulating arguments regarding
Reply/Opposition regarding Summary Judgment
Motions.
Working on opposition of Summary judgment;
working on motion to strike; correspond w / Bowman
f.51
Begin drafting .Analysis section of Summary Judgment
Reply/ Opposition.
Continue drafting detailed Counter arguments in
analysis section of Opposition/Reply regarding
SummarvJudementMotions
Continue drafting Memorandum in Reply/Opposition
to SUJ.u.u.i.u V Judement.
Edits re Plaintiffs' Combined Reply
:Major re-write of opposition/reply; working on case
law to support argument; working w / Bowman on
argument; major re-write of motion to strike and
memorandum in support of same; working on Rule
56(i) are:uments f2.21
Work with JEW on Opposition/Reply Memorandum
rel?a!ding SUJ..1.11.1.uUv Judement.
Continue drafting Reply/Opposition Memorandum
for Partial SUJ..1111= v Judement.
Editing combined opposition and reply brief
throughout day; working on responses to statements
of facts; review Rehn affidavits; working on additional
case citation and review cases; editing memorandum in
support of motion to strike; working on briefs
throughout dav f2.6l
Finalize Combined Memorandum regarding Summary
Judgment (1.1);
Prepare table of contents and table of authorities for
combined opposition and reply to cross motions for
s ____-~ judement.
Review, analyze, and respond to Charlie's email
inquiry.
Work with JEW on arguments from opposing
counsel's email.
Work with SKG on hearing for summary judgment
motions and motion to strike.
Prepare request to submit for decision on plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment, defendants'
motion for partial summary judgment and plaintiffs
motion to strike Christensen Declaration.
Research factual basis for counte.ramuments.
Work with JEW on preparation for Summary
Judgment/Motion to Strike Hearing.
Research case law regarding inappropriateness of
raising issues for the first time on reply.
Initial preparation for hearing; working on editing
opposition to motion to amend. f1.31
Assist in preparing for hearing on motions for
s......~ ..-... v judement and motion to strike.

]CB

.7

$215.00

$150.50

JEW

.5

$350.00

$175.00

]CB

3.20

$215.00

$688.00

]CB

6.90

$215.00

$1,483.50

]CB

2.80

$215.00

$602.00

CST
JEW

3.00
2.20

$75.00
$350.00

$225.00
$770.00

]CB

0.20

$215.00

$43.00

]CB

2.90

$215.00

$623.50

JEW

2.60

$350.00

$910.00

]CB

1.1

$215.00

$236.50

BC]

1.60

$100.00

$160.00

]CB

0.40

$215.00

$86.00

]CB

.6

$215.00

$129.00

]CB

0.30

$215.00

$64.50

BC]

0.60

$100.00

$60.00

TCB
JCB

.60
.5

$215.00
$215.00

$129.00
$107.50

]CB

.3

$215.00

$64.50

JEW

1.30

$350.00

$455.00

]CB

4.50

$215.00

$967.50

u

Nov-27-13
Dec-10-13
Dec-17-13

Dec-30-13

Jan-02-14
Jan-07-14
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Jan-08-14
Jan-09-14

Jan-10-14

Work with CSTon rsic.l preparing for hearing.
Prepare for hearing and work with two huge binders
forhearingpreparation.r3.0]
Early morning prep for hearing; travel to hearing;
conduct hearing and obtain release of escrow deposit;
follow-up work on order afterwards. f2.3l
Working on follow-up from yesterdays [sic.] hearing.

JCB
JEW

0.30
3.00

$215.00
$350.00

$64.50
$1,050.00

JEW

2.30

$350.00

$805.00

JEW

0.30

$350.00

$105.00

f.31
TOTALS

126.3

$29,998.50

The following chart summarizes the costs that Plaintiffs failed to allocate:
DATE

COST

AMOUNT

Feb-01-13

Lexis Nexis

Feb-28-13

Lexis Nexis

$168.08
$439.81

.Apr-30-13

Lexis Nexis

$85.23

Jun-30-13

$231.85

Jul-31-13

Lexis Nexis
Lexis Nexis

$980.71

Aug-31-13

Lexis Nexis

$20.79

Dec-01-13

Lexis Nexis
Lexis Nexis

$166.55

Jan-31-14

$503.41

TOTALS

$2,596.43

IL The remainder of the awarded attorney fees are still unreasonable.
After deducting the costs and fees that Plaintiffs failed to prove were necessary to remove
the lien, there remains $33,835.86, but this amount is not reasonable and should be reduced to
$20,000. An award of attorney fees must be based on evidence and supported by findings of fact.
Cottonwood, 830 P .2d at 268. A trial judge is not compelled to accept "self-interested testimony whole
cloth" and award all fees requested. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 989 (Utah 1988).
Instead, the trial court "must make an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the
requested fees in light of the parties' evidentiary submissions." Cottonwood, 830 P.2d at 269. Among
others, a court must consider the following factors:
1. the difficulty of the litigation;
2. the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case;
3. the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case;
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4. the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services;
5. the amount in controversy and the result attained; and
6. the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved.

Bracken, 764 P .2d at 989. The number of hours spent on the case is not determinative: "The
appropriateness of the work actually performed and of the attorney's billing rate is evaluated before
a reasonable fee is set." Id. at 990.
Considering these factors, the remaining $33,835.86 is an unreasonable fee for the work
performed. The litigation from filing to summary judgment was not particularly difficult. As
illustrated by the examples below, Plaintiffs' attorneys were extremely inefficient. While the charge
per hour of Plaintiffs' attorneys and support staff are fees customarily charged in the locality, the
amount in controversy, $40,000, was too low to justify the amount of hours spent on this case.
Finally, Mr. \Vrona and Mr. Bowman are experienced and intelligent attorneys who should have
been able to efficiently prosecute Plaintiffs' claims against Steve.
The most glaring example of inefficiency is the work expended to obtain Bruce Lindell's
affidavit. The affidavit is only seven sentences long. But, as illustrated below, Plaintiffs' attorneys
spent 5.1 hours and billed $1,256.00 to prepare it. This is inefficient and unreasonable.
DATE

DESCRIPTION

AITY

HRS

RATE

AMT

May-27-13

Correspond 111/ Charlie on Bruce Lindell; write
up outline for obtaining summary judgment if
we are successful in obtaining affidavit from
Bruce Lindell f.51
Working on discovery requests edits; working on
strategy for Bruce Lindell
Review and analyze email from Charlie about Bruce
Lindell
Email Charlie about speaking with Lindell
Quick meeting with Charlie [.3]
Meeting with Charlie and Joe reearcling Lindell
Work with JEW on Lindell Affidavit
Beirin drafting Affidavit of Bruce Lindell.
Working on red.line of Lindell affidavit [.4]
Continue drafting Lindell's Affidavit.
Email Charlie a draft of Lindell's Affidavit

JEW

.5

$350.00

$175.00

JEW

.5

$350.00

$105.00

]CB

.1

$215.00

$21.50

JCB
JEW
JCB
JCB
JCB
JEW
JCB
JCB

.1
.3
.3
.1
1.8
.4
.2
.1

$215.00
$350.00
$215.00
$215.00
$215.00
$350.00
$215.00
$215.00

$21.50
$105.00
$64.50
$21.50
$387.00
$140.00
$43.00
$21.50

May-28-13

Jun-07-13
lun-20-13
Jun-21-13
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Email Charlie regarding Christensen,s deposition and
Lindell Affidavit
Email Charlie regarding meeting with Lindell,
payment, and discovery responses.
Email Charlie to follow-up on Lindell Affidavit
Email Charlie to follow-up on Lindell Affidavit

Jul-11-13
Jul-25-13
Aug-12-13

JCB

.1

$215.00

$21.50

JCB

.40

$215.00

$86.00

JCB
JCB

.1
.1

$215.00
$215.00

$21.50
$21.50

TOTALS

5.1

$1,256.00

As another glaring example of inefficiency, as illustrated below, Plaintiffs' attorneys spent
19.1 hours and charged $4,106.50 working on Plaintiffs' opposition to Steve's motion to amend. The
legal argument in Steve's memorandum in support of the motion to amend is one page long.

Memorandum

of Points

and Authorities in Support

of Defendants

Motion for L.eave to Amend Answer and

Counter-Complaint, filed December 24, 2013. Plaintiffs' legal argument is seven pages long. Opposition
to Motion for L.eave to Amend Answer and Counter Complaint, filed January 8, 2014. Further, a motion to
amend is an extremely routine motion that is easy to respond to. There was simply no reason to
spend almost twenty hours working on the opposition.
DATE

DESCRIPTION

Dec-30-13

Review and analyze motion to amend and begin
formulating counterarguments.
Research case law regarding denials of motions to
amend.
Begin drafting opposition to Motion for Leave to
.Amend.
Continue drafting Opposition to Motion to .Amend
Continue drafting Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and CounterComplaint.
Research case law regarding futility of amendments.
Research case law regarding moving to amend to
conform with evidence without providing any new
evidence.
Continue drafting Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Amend.
Continue working on Opposition to Motion to
Amend.
Continue drafting Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Amend.
Continue drafting Opposition to Motion to Amend.
Draft Wrona Affidavit to include with Opposition
to Motion to Amend.

Dec-31-13
Jan-02-14

Jan-03-14
Jan-06-14
Jan-07-14.
Jan-08-14

ATIY
JCB

HRS

RATE

0.70

$215.00

AMT
$150.50

JCB

1.3

$~15.00

$279.50

]CB

2.0

$215.00

$430.00

JCB
JCB

3.7
3.9

$215.00
$215.00

$795.50
$838.50

_JCB
JCB

.3
.5

$215.00
$215.00

$64.50
$107.50

]CB

2.9

$215.00

$623.50

]CB

0.20

$215.00

$43.00

]CB

0.70

$215.00

$150.50

JCB
JCB

2.50
0.40

$215.00
$215.00

$537.50
$86.00
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I

119.10

$4,106.50

The time spent and amount billed for researching statutes of limitations and !aches also serve
as an example of inefficiency. These topics are quite simple. There are very specific statutes
governing the time in which claims may be brought. Further, !aches is not a difficult subject to
master. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' attorneys, as shown below, spent 14.4 and charged $3,096.00
researching them. This is unreasonable.
DATE
A.pr-12-13

Jun-27-13
Jul-01-13

Jul-02-13

DESCRIPTION
Research case law regarding statute of
limitations as bar to lien enforcement.
Research defense of laches as possible grounds
for motion to dismiss.
Begin researching Christensen's statute of
limitations arguments
Continue researching case law regarding
Christensen's statute of limitations argument
regarding removal of the lien
Research statute of limitations case law as it
applies to injunctive relief.
Continue researching statute of limitations as
applied to declarato.rv jud ent action.
Conduct detailed legal analysis regarding the
statute of limitations as it applies to declaratory

ATIY

HRS
.9

RATE
$215.00

AMT

JCB
JCB

1.1

$215.00

$236.50

JCB

1.9

$215.00

$408.50

]CB

1.9

$215.00

$408.50

JCB

.3

$215.00

$64.50

]CB

.5

$215.00

$107.50

JCB

4.2

$215.00

$903.00

JCB

1.5

$215.00

$322.50

JCB

.5

$215.00

$107.50

]CB

.5

$215.00

$107.50

JCB

.5

$215.00

$107.50

JCB

.40

$215.00

$86.00

JCB

.20

$215.00

$43.00

$193.50

judgment claim.

Continue researching interplay between
declaratory judgment cause of action and
statute of limitations.
Research elements of permanent injunction and
interplay with statute of limitations.
Research elements of promissory estoppel and
interplay with statute of limitations.
Research wrongful lien claim and interplay
with statute of limitations.
Research case law asserted by Defendants regarding
statute of limitations not beginning until sale of
property to third oartv.
Research case law supporting argument against
Defendants' statute of limitations argument.

Jul-03-13

Jul-23-13

Jul-24-13

14.4

TOTALS

$3,096.00

Plaintiffs also conducted discovery in an extremely inefficient manner. Again, this is not a
difficult case. Additionally, in addition to initial disclosures, each side only sent the other one set of
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discovery requests each, and only one deposition was conducted. See Docket entries for 05-29-2013,
06-26-2013, 07-01-2013, 07-11-2013, and 08-08-2013. But, as illustrated below, by spending too long
preparing disclosures, discovery requests, discovery responses, by duplicating work, and by spending
excessive amounts of time doing things that their clients or legal assistants should have been doing,
Plaintiffs' attorneys spent 39.3 hours and charged $9,678.00 working on discovery.
DATE

DESCRIPTION

AITY

HRS

RATE

AMT

Apr-15-13

Begin drafting Plaintiffs' Initial Disclosures as
requii:ed bv Civil Rule 26.
Continue drafting Plaintiffs, Initial Disclosures as
requii:ed bv the Civil Rules of Procedtll'e
Compile and review documents to be produced with
initial disclostll'es.
Email Charlie to follow up on possible additional
documents
Teleconference with Charlie.
Continue drafting and compiling Plaintiffs' Initial
Disclosures
Working on initial disclostll'es; working on discovery
Finalize initial disclosures
Coordinate filing and service of initial
disclosures.
Draft Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs' Initial
Disclostll'es; assemble documents to produce with
Initial Disclosures.
Check on possibility of issuing written discovery
requests
Follow-up on whether opposing counsel ever
submitted initial disclosures
Research timing requirements associated with
issuin~ discovery requests.
Begin drafting First Set of Discovery Requests to
Defendants.
Continue drafting First Set of Discovery
Requests to Defendants.
Continue drafting First Set of Discovery
Requests to Christensen et al.
Coordinate with AS to issue discovery requests
to Christensen et al.
Draft Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs First
Set of Discovery Requests, use court's ECF
system for timely filing of First Set of
Discovery Requests and service on opposing
counsel.
Attention to email from]. Bowman re:
deposition notice for Christensen; prepare
notice of deposition re: same.

JCB

1.10

$215.00

$236.50

JCB

.4

$215.00

$86.00

Apr-17-13
Apr-18-13

Apr-19-13
Apr-20-13
Apr-22-13

Apr-30-13
May-09-13
May-10-13

May-13-13
May-14-13
May-29-13

Jul-01-13

I

JCB

1.30

$215.00

$279.50

JCB

.1

$215.00

$279.50

JCB
JCB

.1
.5

$215.00
$215.00

$21.50
$107.50

JEW
JCB

]CB

.4
.10
.10

$350.00
$215.00
$215.00

$140.00
$21.50
$21.50

AS

.80

$75.00

$60.00

]CB

.1

$215.00

$21.50

]CB

.4

$215.00

$86.00

JCB

.1

$215.00

$21.50

]CB

.5

$215.00

$107.50

JCB

3.9

$215.00

$838.50

JCB

.4

$215.00

$86.00

]CB

.2

$215.00

$43.00

AS

.5

$75.00

$37.50

BCJ

.5

$100.00

$50.00

ADDErlfDUM 6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

R. 03671

Jul-26-13
Jun-27-13

Jul-01-13

Jul-08-13
Jul-10-13
Jul-11-13

Jul-12-13

Jul-18-13

Jul-30-13
Aug-02-13
Aue:-05-13

I.ii) ..

Continue drafting responses to discovery requests
from Christensen et al.
Revie,;1,· initial disclosures submitted by defendant;
working w /Tared on a deposition strategy r.s1
Review and analyze discovery responses from
Christensen et al.
Email correspondence with opposing counsel
re2arding deposition dates for Steve Christensen
Attention to email from]. Bowman re: deposition
notice for Christensen; prepare notice of deposition
re: same.
Begin identifying necessary deposition topics for
Christensen Deposition
Continue working on preparing for deposition of
Steve Christensen.
Prepare for Christensen deposition; working on
documents; working on outline of deposition; work
w/ Jared; work w/ Charlie f3.61
Work withJEW on deposition strategy.
Compile potential deposition exhibits and draft
outline topic and documents for Christensen's
Deposition.
Finalize Christensen deposition scheduling.
Begin reviewing and analyzing Christensen's
discoverv requests.
Email Christensen's discovery requests to Charlie
for review and answers.
Early morning deposition preparation; travel to
Draper to depose Christensen; follow up work after
deposition; teleconference after deposition on lease
and other issues (7:00 am to 2:00 pm actual, charge 5
hours)f5.0]
Assist in last minute preparations for Christensen's
deposition.
Work with JEW on results of deposition.
Draft Initial Responses to Christensen's Discovery
Requests
Begin drafting responses to Discovery Requests
from opposing counsel
Continue drafting responses to discovery requests
from Christensen et al.
Review transcript of Christensen deposition;
correspond w / Charlie on same f.41
Working on Charlie's comments to Steve
Christensen deposition f.31
Obtain transcript of Christensen's deposition.
Working with JEW on discovery responses and
possible additional requests.
Review and analyze transcript of Christensen's
Deposition.
Review and analyze comments from Charlie on
Christensen's Deposition.

JCB

1.10

$215.00

$236.50

JEW

.5

$350.00

$175.00

JCB

.8

$215.00

$172.00

]CB

.3

$215.00

$64.50

BC]

.5

$100.00

$50.00

]CB

.3

$215.00

$64.50

]CB

1.70

$215.00

$365.50

JEW

3.6

$350.00

$1,260.00

JCB

.4

]CB

2.6

$215.00
$215.00

$86.00
$559.00

JCB

.1

]CB

.3

$215.00
$215.00

$21.50
$21.50

]CB

.1

$215.00

$21.50

JEW

5.0

$350.00

$1,750.00

]CB

.6

$215.00

$129.00

JCB
CST

.1
1.00

$215.00
$75.00

$21.50

]CB

1.1

$215.00

$236.50

JCB

1.1

$215.00

$236.50

JEW

.3

$350.00

$105.00

JCB

]CB

.1
.1

$215.00
$215.00

$21.50
$21.50

]CB

.8

$215.00

$172.00

]CB

.2

$215.00

$43.00
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Aug-06-13

Aug-07-13

Aug-08-13

Begin compiling and preparing documents to
produce in .response to requests from Christensen et
al.
Working on discovery responses f.91
Continue drafting .responses to discovery
requests from Christensen et al.
Continue working on responses to discovery
requests from Christensen et al.
Editing inte.croirato.rv responses r.31
Work with JEW on additional discovery requests to
Christensen et al.
Email opposing counsel regarding .review of
complete file.
Review and analyze response from opposing counsel
reira.rding review of complete file.
Email draft of responses to Charlie for review
before submitting the same to opposing counsel.
Final edit to mte.crogatory responses f.31
Finalize responses to discovery requests from
Christensen et al.

]CB

1.00

$215.00

$215.00

JEW

]CB

.9
1.2

$350.00
$215.00

$315
$258.00

JCB

.50

$215.00

$107.50

TEW
JCB

.3
.1

$350.00
$215.00

$105.00
$21.50

JCB

.1

$215.00

$21.50

]CB

.1

$215.00

$21.50

]CB

.1

$215.00

$21.50

JEW

.3
0.50

$350.00
$215.00

$105.00
$107.50

]CB

TOTALS

39.3 hrs

$9,678.00

CONCLUSION
The Court should reduce the jury's verdict and its judgment to $20,000.00. The jury
improperly awarded $11,321.S0_in attorney fees that were incurred working on unsuccessful claims,
unsuccessful motions, and claims unrelated to removal of the lien. Further, Plaintiffs failed to prove
that $32,594.93 in costs and attorney fees were actually necessary to remove the lien because they
failed to allocate them. Finally, the remaining attorney fees are unreasonable due to the inefficient
manner in which Plaintiffs' attorneys prosecuted this case.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED Steve respectfully requests that this Court
reduce the jury's verdict and amend the judgment against him to $20,000 in damages. Alternatively,
Steve requests that the Court award him a new trial.
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DA1ED 19th clay of January, 2015.
CHRISTENSEN CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC

Isl Craig L. Pankratz
David M. Corbett
Craig L. Pankratz

Attom~sfar Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND JUDGMENT, OR MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL has been sent via electronic filing on this 19th

day of January, 2015, to:
Wrona Law Firm, P.C.
Joseph E. Wrona
Jared C. Bowman
1745 Sidewinder Drive
Park City UT 84060
Facsimile: (435) 649-59559

Is I Craig L. Pankratz
AN EMPLOYEE OF CHRISTENSEN CORBETT &

P.Al\JXRATZ, P. C
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ADDENDUM 7: Ruling and Order
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT-Sli~\Hl'T

2015 FEB 13 AH II= 2lt
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT hJ~
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY. STATE OF UTA~ILED ev-:-1Y.;..J~..,,__--

CHARLES C. REHN,

RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 130500115

vs.
February 13, 2015

STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN, an
individual; and STEVE S.
CHRISTENSEN, P.C., a Utah
professional corporation,

Judge Ryan M. Harris

Defendants.

Before the Court is a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Motion to Alter or
st
),

Amend Judgment, or Motion for New Trial ('The Motion

filed by Defendants Steve S.

Christensen and Steve S. Christensen, P.C. tDefendants11). The Motion is fully briefed and
ready for decision. No party has requested oral argument
This matter was tried to a jury in December 2014 on one claim: Plaintiff's claim for
slander of title. After hearing the evidence and argument, the jury determined that Defendants
had acted with malice in recordin9 a lien against Plaintiff's home, and that Plaintiff had incurred
$77,752.29 in attorneys• fees that were reasonably necessary to remove clouds from the title to
his property. See Special Verdict Form. By the Motion, Defendants ask the Court to reduce the
jurys determination of,damages from $77,752.29 to $20,000.00. For the reasons stated.below,
the Court DENIES the Motion.
Because "it is the jury's exclusive function to weigh the evidence, a jury verdict should
not be regarded lightly nor overturned without good and sufficient reason. 0 See ASC Utah, Inc.
v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC.• 2013 UT 24, 1f18, 309 P.3d 201. Indeed, a trial court 11may grant
a JNOV motion only if there is no basis in the evidence, including reasonable inferences which
could be drawn therefrom, to support the jury's determination. 0 Id.
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REHN v. CHRISTENSEN et al.

Case No. 130500115

In the Motion, Defendants argue that the amount the jury awarded was too high,
because they assert that this amount includes fees incurred In litigating unsuccessful motions or
tangential aspects of the litigation that were not directly related to clearing the .title of the

property. However, in this case, the jury was instructed on the law, and was expressly informed
as follows:

In slander of title cases, attorney fees may constitute recoverable damages if the
fees incurred were reasonably necessary to remove clouds from a party's title to
property. For instance, if it is reasonably necessary for a property owner to file a
lawsuit in ·order to remedy defects in his title resulting· from a s1anderous
statement affecting his title, any fees and costs incurred in that lawsuit, ·up to the
point in the lawsuit when title is cleared, that were reasonably necessary to
remove the clouds on title are recoverable as damages in a slander of title case.
See Jury Instruction No. 36. Defendants did not object to this instruction, and even now do not

take issue with it. Thus, the jury was told what their task was: to examine the evidence
presented by Plaintiff with regard to his claimed fees, and to analyze Plaintiff's damages claims
through the lens of determining what portion of the claimed fees. if any, were reasonably
0

necessary to remove clouds from a party's title to property."

At trial, Plaintiff presented evidence of his claimed damages, not only through
documents (the bill~ng records were entered into evidence) but also through the testimony of
Jared Bowman, an attorney at the Wrona Law Firm who was knowledgeable about the fees and
what they were incurred for.

Mr. Bowman testified that all of the claimed fees, totaHng

$77~ 752.29, were reasonably incurred in clearing tHle.

Defendants did not call a damages

witness of their own (e.g., an attorney expert to testify as to reasonableness of fees Incurred)
but, rather, chose to rely on a vigorous cross-examination of Mr. Bowman through use of the
billing records. The Court does not have at its disposal a transcript of Defendants' counsel's
cross-examination of Mr. Bowman, but the Court certainly recalls vigorous cross-examination on
many of the ·issues raised in the Motion (e.g., that some of the claimed fees were Incurred for

other things not directly related to clearing title, and that some of the claimed fees were bloated
and unreasonable), and certainly recalls Defendants' counsel making many of the same·
2
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REHN v. CHRISTENSEN

et al.

arguments during closing argument

Case No. 130500115

The jury had the opportunity to listen to the testimony and

arguments and had the opportunity i·n the jury room during deliberation to pore over the billing
records. There is no question that the jury's award of $77,752.29 was supported by at least
some substantial evidence, and there is therefore no basis for the court to overturn it on a JNOV
motion or on a motion grounded in Utah R Civ. P. 59(a)(6) (which allows a trial court to grant a
new trial if there is an "insufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict").
Defendants further ask the Court to engage in

an analysis of whether the fees ·were

reasonable, and whether the fees were properly allocated to the successful slander of title claim
(as opposed to other claims upon which Plaintiff was unsuccessful). However, Defendants
misperceive the nature of the post.trial inquiry that the Court is allowed to engage in. This is not

a case where the Court is assessing the amount of fees based on an award of attomey fees in a
"prevailing party' context.

Certainly, in that context, it is up to the Court to determine

reasonableness of feest and up to the Court to make sure that fees• are properly allocated
between successful and unsuccessful claims.

But in this cont~~. where the ju,:y was

specifiCS,ly asked to engage in precisely that exercise after proper instruction1 it does not fall to

the Court to s·econd-guess the jury1s decision ih that regard, unless ttie ju_ry's de~ion was one
for which "th~re is no basis in th~ evidence. includi_ng reasonable jnferences which could be
drawn therefrom, to support the jury's determination." See ASC Utah. 2013 UT 24, 1[18.1 And
as discussed above, this case is not that sort of case.
Finally, Defendants ask ~is Court to apply the principles .set forth in Colquhoun v.
Webber1 684 A2d 405 (Me. 1996), a case in which the appellate court reversed a trial court's
damages award (imposed after a bench trial) in a slander of title case. There, the trial court

awarded damages In the form of all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the entire slander of
title lawsuit The appellate court reversed, stating that ihe prevailing party in a slander of title
1

Plaintiff rightly points out that It was Defendants-and not Plaintiff-who demanded a jury trial and
refused to waive that demand at pretrial, thereby making the conscious decision to submit these issues to
·
thejury and not to the Court
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REHN v. CHRISTENSEN et al.

action may recover as special damages those attorney fees and expenses accruing from
removing the cloud on the title, 11 an amount that is not necessarily the same (and usually is not
the same) as the entire amount of fees and costs incurred in the whole case. Id. at 413.
However, in this case (as noted above}, the Court and the jury have already applied these
principles, exactly as set forth in Webber. Before allowing the damages evidence to go to the
jury, the Court made sure during pretrial proceedings that the damages evidence Plaintiff would
present to the jury was not simply all attorneys' fees incurred in the whole case ~ rather, just

those fees that were incurred

pnor to the Court's summary judgment ruling clearing title.

Even

after trial, the Court rejected a post-trial request from Plaintiff to award fees incurred in the entire
case. See Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs as Prevailing
Party, dated January 21, 2015.

Most importantly, as discussed already above, the Court

instructed the jury to award only those fees reasonably incurred in clearing title, a point which
was vigorously argued by counsel.

For all of these reasons, the Court finds no basis to disturb the jury's verdict, regardless
of whether Defendants' Motion is viewed as a JNOV motion pursuant to Rule 52 or a motion for

a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. There was competent evidence in the record to support the

jurts verdieli and the Court

will

not disturb it on post-trial motions. Accordingly, the Motion Is

DENIED. 111is Rufing and Order is the order of the Court, and no further writing is necessary to
effectuate this decision.
DATED this

f3\'k

day of February, 2015.

•
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
peo~le for case 130500115 by the method and on the date specified.

MANUAL
MANUAL
MANUAL
MANUAL

EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

JARED C BOWMAN bowman®Wgdlawfirm. com
DAVID M CORBETT dmc@ccplawyers.com
CRAIG L PANKRATZ clp@ccplawyers.com
JOSEPH B WRONA wrona®wgdlawfirrn.com

02/13/2015

/s/ BRIDGETTE BLONQUIST

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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ADDENDUM 8: Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs
as Prevailing Party
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David M. Corbett (U.S.B. No. 13946)
dmc@ccplawvers.com
Craig L. Pankratz ru.S.B. No. 12194)
Christensen Corbett & Pankratz, pile
340 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 303-5800
Attorneys for Steve S. Christensen, Steve S. Christensen, P.C., Christensen Corbett & Pankratz,
PLLC, and Hirschi Christensen, P LLC

In The Third Judicial District Court in and for
Summit County, State of Utah

CHARLES C. REHN, an individual; and
that certain real property located at 4118
SADDLEBACK ROAD, PARK CITY,

UTAH

s
Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs as
Prevailing Party

Plaintiffs,
V.

STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, an individual;
STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, P.C., a Utah
professional corporation; HENROID,
NIELSEN, & CHRISTENSEN, a Utah
general partnership; CHRISTENSEN,
CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC, a Utah
professional limited liability company;
IDRSCID CHRISTENSEN, PLLC, a Utah
professional limited liability company; and
ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO
CLAIM ANY INTEREST IN THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION.

Civil No. 130500115

Judge Ryan Harris

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs as
Prevailing Party. The Court held a hearing on January 8, 2015 to discuss the motion. Plaintiffs were
represented by Joesph Wrona, and DefendcfrtQ~~Rf,l-Me4lted by David Corbett. PlaintifFs
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asserted three grounds for an award of attorney fees: (I) through the retainer agreement between Mr.
Rehn and Mr. Christensen and his law finn; (2) by virtue of Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-826; and (3)
through the Court's inherent equitable powers to award attorney fees when required by justice.
Having received the arguments of the parties, and finding itself fully advised of the premises, the
Court makes the following ruling:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. On October 24, 1997, Charles Rehn ("Rehn") signed a retainer agreement (" 1997 Retainer")
with Henriod, Nielsen & Christensen ("HNC"). Paragraph 15 of the retainer agreement
stated, "In the event legal action is taken to enforce this agreement the law of Utah shall
apply and the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable costs and attorney's fees."
2. Plaintiffs filed their Verified Complaint on February 15, 2013. The complaint asserted five
causes of action: ( 1) A declaratory judgment seeking a judgment that the lien was
unenforceable and void ab initio; (2) A permanent injunction prohibiting efforts to enforce
the lien; (3) Slander of Title; (4) Estoppel; and (5) Wrongful Lien.
3. In their counter-complaint, Defendants sought enforcement of the lien. Defendants cited to
the 1997 Retainer as the basis for the amounts owed and in support of their claim that Rehn
had consented to the lien against his property. The counter-complaint included a request for
attorney fees in prosecuting and defending the matter pursuant to the 1997 Retainer.
4. On January 22, 2014, the Court entered its Order on Summary Judgment Motions. The Court
granted summary judgment to Plaintiff on his first cause of action (declaratory judgment)
and determined that the second cause of action (injunctive relief) was moot. The Court
denied summary judgment to either party on the slander of title cause of action because of
the factual issues related to Defendants' intent when the lien was recorded. The Court denied
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summary judgment on the estoppel cause of action because of factual issues. And the Court
dismissed the Wrongful Lien cause of action. Finally, the Court dismissed Defendants'
counterclaim.
5. The parties then proceeded to trial on the Slander of Title and Estoppel causes of action.
However, after trial concluded, Plaintiffs' withdrew their Estoppel claims.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Generally, attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by statute or contract. Eldridge v.
Farnsworth, 2007 UT App. 243, 151, 166 P.3d 639. A party may recover attorney fees
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 where that party prevails in a civil action based upon a
promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, which
writing contains an attorneys' fee provision that allows at least one party to recover attorneys'
fees. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. As described by the Utah Supreme Court, "an action is
'based upon' a contract under the statute if a 'party to the litigation assert[s] the writing
enforceability as basis for recovery." Hooban v. Unicity lnten., Inc., 2012 UT 40,122,285
P.3d 766 (citing Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, ,I 15, 160 P.3d 1041). If provided by
contract, they can only be awarded in "in strict accordance with the terms of the contract."

Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). For this reason, a trial court must separate fees
related to contractual claims from those fees related to other claims "for which there is no
entitlement for attorney fees." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah
1992).
2. The language of the contract in question only allowed a party to recover attorney fees in a
legal action brought to enforce the terms of the contract. The slander of title claim was not
brought to enforce the terms of the contract and was not otherwise based upon the contract.
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Neither party had a contractual right to recover attorney fees associated with prosecuting or
defending against the slander of title claim. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot recover any fees for
their prosecution for the slander of title cause of action pursuant to the contract or Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-5-826.
3. A court may, however, exercise its inherent authority to award attorney fees where it is
appropriate in the interest of justice and equity. The Court, however, declines to exercise its
equitable powers in this case. Although the jury found that the Defendants acted with malice
when they recorded the subject lien, the Court does not find that the facts of this case
distinguish it from other slander of title cases such that justice requires an award of attorney
fees in addition to those already awarded by the jury, which the jury determined to be
reasonably necessary to remove the cloud oftitle from Mr. Rehn's property. Absent such
facts to distinguish this case from other slander of title of case, Plaintiffs argument would
allow a party to recover all attorney fees in every slander of title case. The Court is not
willing to exercise its discretion in that manner.
Wherefore, premises considered, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs as Prevailing Party is denied.

This order is signed and entered of record as indicated on the top of the first page.
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